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ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN DEATHS AT THE HOSPITAL FOR SICK CHILDREN AND RELATED MATTERS.

Hearing held 8th floor 180 Dundas Street West Toronto, Ontario

The Honourable Mr. Justice S.G.M. Grange

P.S.A. Lamek, Q.C.

E.A. Cronk

Thomas Millar

Commissioner

Counsel

Associate Counsel

Administrator

Transcript of evidence for

August 18, 1983

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ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN DEATHS AT THE HOSPITAL FOR SICK CHILDREN 2 AND RELATED MATTERS. 3 4 5 Hearing held on the 8th Floor, 180 Dundas Street West, Toronto, 6 Ontario, on Thursday the 18th day of August, 1983. 7 8 9 THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.M. GRANGE - Commissioner 10 THOMAS MILLAR - Administrator 11 MURRAY R. ELLIOT - Registrar 12 13 14 APPEARANCES: 15 P.S.A. LAMEK, $\Omega.C.$) Commission Counsel E. CRONK 16 D. HUNT Counsel for the Attorney-General and Solicitor L. CECCHETTO) 17 General of Ontario (Crown Attorneys and Coroner's Office) 18 I.G. SCOTT, Q.C.) Counsel for The Hospital 19 R. BATTY for Sick Children M. THOMSON 20 B. PERCIVAL, Q.C.) Counsel for The Metropolitan D. YOUNG Toronto Police 21 Counsel for numerous Doctors W.N. ORTVED) 22 K. CHOWN) at The Hospital for Sick Children 23 E. MCINTYRE) Counsel for the Registered Nurses' Association of Ontario 24 E. SYMES) and 35 Registered Nurses at The Hospital for Sick Children 25

(Cont'd)

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1	APPEARANCES: (Continued	
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15	F.J. SHANAHAN		Counsel for Mr. & Mrs. Dominic Lombardo (parents of deceased
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17			deceased child Amber Dawson)
18	J. SHINEHOFT		Acting for Lorie Pacsai and Kevin Garnet (parents of
19	~		deceased child Kevin Pacsai)
20			
21			ntidem with House
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---Disscussion off the record.

---Upon commencing at 10:00 a.m.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR. PERCIVAL: Mr. Commissioner, may I file a box of goodies in relation to this as the next exhibit, in relation to the digoxin.

I say for the record, Mr. Commissioner, that on Monday, March 23rd, the year 1981 all digoxin ampules, pills and elixir were seized by the Hospital from all wards in the Hospital and replaced by new products. The ampules, pills and elixir that were taken from the various wards were retained by the Hosiptal's Pharmacy Department and specific tests were made within one month of all of the products that was found in Wards 4A and 4B which were found to be normal by the Centre of Forensic Sciences.

That product was retained by the

Pharmacy Department of the Hospital up until January

of this year, at which time they called on Sergeant

Tony Warr and said that they were running out of

room in the Pharmacy Department and as a result of that

the police officers went to the Pharmacy Department

and picked the product up.

I have available for filing 10 packages of the pedicatric ampules, 10 packages of the adult ampules, 10 bottles of the pediatric elixir and the only pill form that we have, unfortunately, there is

A/BB/ak



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1 2, 4, 6, 8 pills in a capsule of the type of pill 2 form. Those are the only pills that were given to us from the Pharmacy Department. 3 The officers still have in their 4 possession other of the elixir, the adult ampules and 5 the pediatric ampules, but I thought this should be 6 sufficient for your purposes. 7 Yes, I would THE COMMISSIONER: 8 think at least. 9 MR. PERCIVAL: It's enough for all of us I quess. 10 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. 11 MR. PERCIVAL: May I have that 12 marked as the next exhibit. 13 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, all right, 14 Exhibit 131. 15 ---EXHIBIT NO. 131: 10 Boxes - Lanoxin (Adult) 5 Ampoules Injection of Digoxin 16 10 Boxes - Lanoxin - Digoxin Pediatric Elixir 17 10 Boxes - Lanoxin - Digoxin -10 Ampoules - Pediatric 18 1 Bottle - unmarked - containing 8 pills (white) 19 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. 20 Then, Mr. Strathy, you can of course have access to it. 21 MR. STRATHY: Thank you. 22 THE COMMISSIONER: All right, any-23 thing else anyone wants to say?

Yes, Mr. Scott?



EXAMINATION BY

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DR.	RICHARD	DESMOND	ROWE,	Resumed
MR	SCOTT.	(Continue	20	


Q. Doctor, when we finished last night you had produced Exhibit 129 which was your analysis paralleling the New England study of the deaths which are the subject of the inquiry which occurred between June 30th and the end of September, 1980 and I think I had completed dealing with that.

Just to get the matter in prespective however, can you give me the figure for the number of babies that went through Wards 4A and 4B in the epidemic period?

A. I can't give you a specific number but the annual number of patients on the ward is about 1100.

Q. I see. That would be in a 12-month period?

- A. A 12-month period, yes.
- Q. Would it be reasonable to assume that three-quarters of that would be the number in a 9-month period?
 - A. I would think so.
- Q. Yes. So, you would have, let us say, between 800 and 950 or thereabouts patients in a period of 9 months?



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A. Yes	s, I	think	so
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0. Yes. And because this is a cardiology ward, I take it that a substantial number of those patients would be on digoxin?

> Α. Yes.

0. Yes. For either all or part of their time in the Hospital ward.

> Α. Yes.

0. Yes. And I take it also, is it possible for you to give me a rough estimate of the number of the proportion of patients in the ward in the 9-month period who would be on digoxin therapy at some time?

Well, I can't give you that figure but it would be fairly high I would think.


Q. If we are dealing with let's say 800 patients, would there be 500 on digoxin therapy?

I can't really make a good guess at that, Mr. Scott.

0. All right. Well, I take it in cases where there is digoxin therapy there is likely to be serum testing?

> Yes. Α.

Q. Can you tell me the number of



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serum tests that were done?

A. I think the number is somewhere in the order of 1500 during that period. I'm not sure whether they were all on the ward or some of them in the Intensive Unit.

Q. Yes. But during the epidemic period there would be about 1500 tests?

A. Yes. They may not all have been on the ward, they may have been in the neonatal floor too.

 Ω . Well, there is record of that in the Hospital somewhere?

A. Yes, Dr. Ellis would have that record.

 Ω . Well, we're talking in this case of about somewhere between 30 and 45 ante mortem serum tests in connection with our 36 patients.

A. I'm sorry?

Q. No, no. Well, it's an observation rather than a question. There are 36 patients with which we are concerned in this Inquiry.

A. Yes.


 $\ensuremath{\Omega_{\star}}$. Not all of them had predeath serum samples taken.

A. No.

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than one.

Ű.	Some	had	one,	some	had	more

- A. Some had none.
- Ω . And some had none.
- A. Yes.
- O. So, we would be dealing with let us say 50 serum tests more or less, would that be fair?

MR. LAMEK: Mr. Commissioner, is there any basis for that kind of comment, really?

Does it have any significance?

MR. SCOTT: Well, what I'm trying to establish, and perhaps it is so obvious it doesn't need a question, is that of the 1500 serum tests taken, we are focusing in this Inquiry on a relatively small number of those tests.

Now, let me just leave it there. That isn't a question that has to be answered.

Q. What I want to ask you,
Dr. Rowe, is, would it come as any surprise to you
to know that among the other serum tests which are not
before the Commission done during the epidemic period
obviously on patients who lived, because we are
considering all the patients who died ---

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, the figure



than that.

1500 serum tests of course doesn't involve anything like 1500 patients, they involve something like 850, or whatever that number is.

MR. SCOTT: That's correct.

THE COMMISSIONER: And probably less

MR. SCOTT: That's correct, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: 5 or 6 hundred.


MR. SCOTT: What I'm asking Dr. Rowe, and when my turn comes to call evidence, I may call evidence about it, but what I'm asking him now is, bearing in mind that there were taken some 1500 serum tests in this period, many of which, the vast majority of which do not concern 36 babies - are you with me so far?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I am with you.

MR. SCOTT: Q. Would it surprise you to know that many of those tests -- first of all, I'm not being very good this morning, but first of all those serum tests would have been taken on babies who lived?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. Would it surprise you to know that many of those tests revealed serum levels that were above what we have been calling the



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therapeutic norm?

There would be certainly some I would think, yes.

Yes. So, just so I get it 0. clear, it is not every test or, to put it this way, it is not every baby who has a serum test that produces a level above the so-called therapeutic level who dies?

No.


And is it your clinical experience that there are many serum level tests done producing readings above the therapeutic level where the baby is entirely healthy and survives?

Yes, that's correct.

0. Yes. Well, we'll come to a study that talks about that in due course, but I just wanted to get that perspective.

Now, you have dealt with the September conferences. I want you now to, and I think you have prepared at my request an exhibit that deals with the deaths that occurred between the end of September and the end of December, a number of which were reviewed by your group in the January meeting?

> Α. Yes.



			Q.	Yes.	Now,	have	you	got	that
in	front	of	you?						

A. I do.

 $\Omega.$ I have circulated these, Mr. Commissioner. Perhaps Mr. Strathy can hand you that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, you didn't know you were getting this extra job, Mr. Strathy.

Exhibit 132. How do you describe


it, Mr. Scott, what's its title?

MR. SCOTT: It is Consecutive Deaths 4A, 4B, for the period October 15, 1980 to December 24, 1980.

---EXHIBIT NO. 132: Consecutive Deaths 4A, 4B for the period October 15, 1980 to December 24, 1980.

MR SCOTT: Q. I draw to your attention that there were no deaths between October 1st and October 15th and none after December 24th before January the 1st. So, it is really a three month period listing all the deaths which Mr. Lamek has told us concern us in that period.

Do I understand, Dr. Rowe, that this chart has been prepared on the same basis as Exhibit 129?



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Α.	Yes,	it has	,
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Q. So I don't have to go over it, it is explanatory if we understand Exhibit 129.

I take it that at the bottom on page 2 there is a summary of the analysis and findings that are reflected earlier in the chart?

A. Yes.

Q. What conclusions about the severity of illness, size, failure to thrive and risk do you draw from this analysis in relation to those babies?

A. Well, I think the babies involved all had severe malformations. They were mostly very young babies. I think only one being more than - or two being more than two months of age. They had severe malformation by several different classifications, or two different classifications and their electrical mode of death was what one would expect in those situations.

Q. Yes. What about the electrical mode of death with respect to McKeil and Adamo? I note you have observed fibrillation in those two cases.

A. Yes. In McKeil at least there was probably a stimulus defibrillation from the presence of the myocardial necrosis, which is



death of muscle cells prior to the actual event.

Adamo just had a very complex lesion and I can't remember whether there was anything histolically there. I think since he didn't have a post mortem we don't have information about whether he had myocardial necrosis or not, but he had a very complex lesion, so, it would be perhaps acceptable if fibrillation was a factor.



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 Ω . Well now, you have told us that you were away for a large part of the autumn, I think, returning early in December.

Have I got that right?

- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. And I want to focus on what you would have known about these deaths at the end of December or early in January, as you were preparing for this conference that was held in late January and which succeeded the conference held in late September.

I take it that the first thing
you would have observed is that you had statistically
two deaths in the ward in October, one death in
November and five deaths in December; is that right?

A. Yes.

 Ω . I'm sorry, six, I think, in December. I added that wrong. No, five.

THE COMMISSIONER: There are three in October, are there not?

MR. SCOTT: You are right. I am sorry. Three in October.

Three in October, one in November and five in December.

Ω. Now, looking at it statistically and in terms of the pattern in the Hospital, just pretend that is the bar graph, for a moment, and



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comparing that with total cardiac deaths in the Hospital in 1980, in September there was something like thirteen; so that, in October, it was down to ten, and the ward figures were also down for that month, were they not?

A. Yes.

Q. When you come to November, it was down to, I think, eight, and the ward figures were correspondingly down in November.

A. Yes.

Q. In December, all cardiac deaths went up to eleven and the ward deaths went up.

A. Yes.

 Ω . Now, looking at it - and we don't have the graph here, but I have a copy of it - comparing the ward deaths with the ICU deaths --

THE COMMISSIONER: Which exhibit

are you looking at?

MR. SCOTT: I am looking at the coloured exhibit, which is not here but I can show you a copy of it, Mr. Commissioner.

Perhaps I can put it up on here.

Q. Can you stand up here, Dr.

Rowe. I want you to compare the yellow line, which is ICU deaths, with the blue line, which is your ward



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deaths.

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Beginning with September, your ward deaths are at about five and your ICU deaths are Then, in October, as we have seen, your ward deaths go down but the ICU deaths have gone up; haven't they?

> A. Yes.

Q. In November, the ward deaths go down; the ICU deaths have come down but are still higher than they have been?

> Α. Yes.

In December, ward deaths --

MR. MANNING: Excuse me, Mr.

Commissioner, all I can hear back here is Mr. Scott; I can't hear Dr. Rowe. I understand he is trying to give the evidence anyway.

THE COMMISSIONER: I agree with everything you say. I can tell you the doctor is assenting from time to time, and I will let you know whether there is a change.


MR. MANNING: Thank you.

MR. SCOTT: Q. In December, the ward deaths appear to be up.

> Α. Yes.

And the ICU deaths are up Q.

as well.



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Α.	Yes.

Q. Now, looking at that charting just as a statistical exercise, what conclusions, if any, can be drawn about the extent to which ward deaths appear to mimic or pattern deaths all cardiac or deaths ICU?

A. I can't really comment on that. It is a very complex question about the relationship of deaths in one place versus another. I think that is the sort of situation that needs the expertise of the epidemiologists.


Q. But would you agree with me that, from that chart, when it is proved, it appears that, in October, November and December, the ICU deaths go up when the ward deaths go up, and the ICU deaths come down when the ward deaths come down?

A. I can see that.

 Ω . Yes. So, when you returned in December, in early January, that was sort of the statistical picture, and you have now given us this exhibit which is your analysis of these nine babies.

I just want to ask you some questions about these particular cases.

MR. PERCIVAL: Mr. Commissioner, I haven't heard Dr. Rowe say he had all of the statistics



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back in December and January of 1981.

MR. SCOTT: He may not have.

MR. PERCIVAL: I know, but you

keep saying, well, you would have done this or you would have done this, and I haven't heard that yet.

MR. SCOTT: I have not yet said, you would have done anything.

MR. PERCIVAL: The transcript will say otherwise, with respect, Mr. Commissioner.

MR. SCOTT: What is the point my friend wants to make?

MR. PERCIVAL: Well, I would like to end up hearing what the witness has to say; not what Mr. Scott wishes to argue. It doesn't make much difference if all that is going to be said is what he would have done. Did he do it, that is surely the matter.

MR. SCOTT: All right.

Q. Dr. Rowe, when you came to prepare for these two conferences in September and in January, did you look at deaths globally in cardiology, ICU and the wards?

A. We looked at deaths in the Intensive Care area --

O. Yes.



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Q. Yes.

A. -- the fourth floor and anything that was transferred to those areas from outside.

Q. So, you wouldn't have had such a handsome bar graph but you would have had available at that time the substance of that material?

A. Well, we discussed all deaths in the 8.30 conference, so we have a rough idea but we don't have specific moment-to-moment figures on this.

 Ω . Well now, I hope my friends don't object to my leading on this.

On the exhibit that you put forward, would I be correct to have added up that four of these babies were under thirty days old?

A. That was five.

Q. This is in Exhibit 132.

A. I think it is five. I make

five.

THE COMMISSIONER: Under what age?

MR. SCOTT: Under thirty days.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think the

objection to you leading is I don't think it is correct, because there are five on the first page.



page.

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MR. LAMEK: No, four on the first

THE COMMISSIONER: I am wrong, too,
I guess. All right. Four on the first page and
one on the second - five.

MR. SCOTT: Q. Can you tell me - I don't want to lead because it is getting near the end of the week and everybody is getting sensitive about it. Can you tell me - and I mustn't suggest an answer to you - from this chart how many babies appear to have been under thirty days of age?

A. Five.

 Ω . Can you tell me which they

are?

A. Adamo, Lutes, Onofre,

Gosselin and Lombardo.

Q. Now, can you tell me how many appear to be under two months?

A. There appear to be seven under two months.

Q. Now, I am going to take one very careful chance at leading and ask you if they would all be under six months? With my luck, it is going to turn out that one isn't!

A. They are all under six months.



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				Q.	Can	you	tell	me	how	many	0:
them	were	on	dig.	therapy	y?						

I can suggest this answer to you but I don't want to do that.

Α. I haven't got that on that chart and I can't remember offhand. I can find that number for you.

> 0. Can you find it quickly?

It would take me about five

THE COMMISSIONER: I take it you

can find it faster for him?

MR. SCOTT: Q. I think I can tell you - I don't want to; my friends all get upset.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think you

know, and I will permit you to tell us.

MR. SCOTT: Q. My understanding from the record is all these babies were on dig. therapy except Lombardo and Belanger.

Am I right, Mr. Lamek?

MR. LAMEK: You are right, Mr.

Scott.

MR. SCOTT: Q. All right. That means seven of the nine were on dig. therapy at some time. You will just have to accept that, Dr. Rowe. I



say that.

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think I can also tell you that all of them, when they were on dig. therapy, were recorded as being reasonably normal dosages; their dosages were not all the same but they were recorded as being on reasonably normal dosages, and I am sure Mr. Lamek would not disagree with that.

MR. LAMEK: I am not qualified to

MR. SCOTT: Q. Now, I want to give you the serum levels that were taken with respect to these babies in the period.

Do you have the record somewhere of the serum levels?

- A. Yes, I do.
- Ω . I have McKeil at 4.7.
- A. Greater than 4.7.
- Q. Greater than 4.7?
- A. Yes.
- Ω. Which way is that arrow

supposed to go?


- A. Pointing towards the figure 4.
- Q. Volk, 1.4.
- A. I don't have that, but I can

check that.

 Ω . Lutes, at 2.1.



1 2 B10 Α. I have one value of 2.8 for Lutes. 3 Q. All right. 4 Onofre, at 1.1. 5 I can't find anything on 6 that. Let me leave you with Q. 8 Onofre at 1.1. My research reveals that. 9 Α. Yes. 10 0. And Gosselin, at 3.7. Α. Yes. 11 Ω. Are there any other serum 12 samples in this group, apart from the ones that I have 13 set out, of which you are now aware? 14 Α. No. 15 And, again, of course, no 0. 16 post mortem levels were taking during this period? Α. No. 17 And your Exhibit 132 illus-18 trates that six of these went to autopsy. 19 Six went to autopsy. 20 Now, two of the serum levels, Q. 21 as I understand it - McKeil had greater than 4.7 and 22 Gosselin had 3.7 - appeared to be higher serum levels 23 than the manual might predict as therapeutic; is that 24



right?

Q. Now, leave McKeil and Gosselin aside just for a moment. I want to ask you if there was any evidence by early January in this period upon which you could rely that pointed in any way to digoxin toxicity as a cause of any deaths?

Yes.

Α.

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	Α.	No	solid	eviden	ce in	that
direction.	There was	a que	estion	in some	e of	the
possible cor	ntribution	towar	ds the	e death	but	those
were - that	was McKeil	. I th	nink.			

 Ω . Leave McKeil and Gosselin out of it, and if you want to, we will take even a broader picture; leave out Gage in the previous period.

A. Yes.

MR. SCOTT: That is the one,
Mr. Commissioner, where you pointed out correctly
yesterday that the reading I think in Gage was 3.5.

Q. Leave out for the moment

McKeil, Gage and Gosselin, and was there any evidence,
looking back at the previous six months - I don't want
to talk about now or March; I want to talk about early

January - was there any evidence upon which you could
rely that pointed to digoxin toxicity?

A. No. I don't believe so, no.

O. Now we have before us at this Inquiry the records, and Mr. Lamek has taken you to a number of records such as Dr. Weber's note in the Woodcock case, such as a note on an electrocardiogram which had dig question mark and he has taken you to the readings, and I just want to clear one matter.

At page 2618 Mr. Lamek asked you this





question and you gave this answer.

THE COMMISSIONER: What volume?

Excuse me; what volume?


MR. SCOTT: July 21st.

THE COMMISSIONER: Volume 15. Page?

MR. SCOTT: Page 2618.

Q. And Mr. Lamek there is moving down to the January review and has been talking about the 20 deaths that have occurred I think up until the end of December (the same period that I am talking about), and at line 10, Dr. Rowe, he asked this question, and if you will just listen to the question and the answer then I want to ask you something about it.

"Doctor, we have gone through approximately 20 deaths in the course of the last few days, and you have been patient with me, but in the latter half of 1980, is it not fair to say that a number of people involved in the Cardiology wards at one time or another raised the question that one or another of these deaths may have resulted from, or may have exhibited signs of digoxin intoxication.



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"Have we not seen that in the course of the review of the deaths that we have looked at?"

Now this is where I get my habit about leading questions, of course. And your answer is:

"That has been raised, yes."

(Q.) But at least raised the possibility of digoxin toxicity -- (A.) Yes."

Now, Dr. Rowe, we have the records and they will speak for themselves; we have the serum readings and they will speak for themselves.


Do you have any recollection apart from the record and the readings of any person, doctor or nurse, raising with you the question of these deaths resulting from digoxin intoxication before the spring of 1981?

A. No, I do not.

I should say that during the morning conferences it is possible that there were comments about the therapeutic dig. level but other than that, no.

Q. All right.

THE COMMISSIONER: I wonder if I could just clarify that. There were comments about



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therapeutic levels? You mean whether they exceeded them?

THE WITNESS: No, whether or not the level therapeutically might have had some contribution, played some part in the final events. But I think that can't be excluded in some of those levels that we have just recently talked about and I think I have said that before.

THE COMMISSIONER: There was some suggestion made that the therapeutic level (that is a proper level, apparently proper level) might have contributed to the deaths?

THE WITNESS: Yes. A high therapeutic level.

MR. SCOTT: Ω. Now in the nine deaths on Exhibit 132, I am going to tell you and I think it can be proved elsewhere, that of the seven babies who died on that list who were on digoxin therapy, and I have excluded Lombardo and Adamo, three of the babies on digoxin therapy died during the day and four of the babies on digoxin therapy died during the night, and by the night I mean between 12 midnight and 6:00 a.m.

Q. Did you draw any conclusions from that in January, 1981 as you prepared for your



conference, apart from the kind of conclusions and impressions that you discussed with me yesterday when we were talking about September?

Did you see anything else in that figure that alarmed you or upset you?

A. No.


Q. In looking at the matter as at January, 1981, based on the information that was available to you and the other cardiologists do you see, and speaking only of what you knew then - don't tell us about March - do you see anything that leads you to review the conclusions you then drew about the cause of death in these cases?

A. No.

Q. Was there anything in any autopsy done before the end of December, 1980, that caused you to alter or suggested the possibility of altering the cause of death which you and the cardiology team had assigned in the patients who had died before the end of December, leaving aside Woodcock?

A. Well, Woodcock is the only one that I can recall where there was any change.

Q. Let me ask you: I have given you the serum levels for the period where they existed



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for the period October 1st to December 31st. I have read them out to you.

In your professional opinion based on your clinical experience is there anything alarming or concerning about those serum levels.

- A. The only one would be the question of McKeil whose value we can't say precisely what it might have been.
 - Q. Apart from McKeil.
- A. But the problem with McKeil is that the level was obtained at a very a relatively short interval after the last dose was administered.
- Q. We will be coming to McKeil, and if you have a reservation about McKeil we will just note it. Apart from McKeil were there any serum levels that caused you as an experienced clinician to feel concern about digoxin as a cause of these deaths?
 - A. No, I don't think so.
 - Q. All right.
- A. The levels for Gage and 'Gosselin though higher than the manual is not alarming to me given the state of the babies and the fact that digoxin was withheld.
 - Q. Now I take it that the action



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of digo	xin	in	the b	ody,	it	s precise	pharmacologica
action,	is	a	matter	for	a	pharmacolo	ogist?

A. I believe that is true.

Q. But that a cardiologist has to know something about the bottom line; that is, how it operates?

A. Yes.

 $\,$ Q . But the scientific understanding of its properties and its operation is within the discipline of the pharmacologist?

A. Yes.

Q. And we have already established that Dr. Kauffman who gave evidence in the Gary Murphy inquest was a highly experienced pharmacologist.

A. Yes.

Q. Now I have the inquest here and I want to read you some passages from it to see if you agree with them or if you don't or if they were part of your understanding about digoxin at the relevant time. And I point out because it is necessary to understand it that in the Murphy case there were pre-mortem serum levels of 4.9 and postmortem serum levels of 18 and 20.

This death, of course, occurs, I think, does it not, Doctor, outside the epidemic period?



Α.	Y	es	
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Q. Now, at page number 7,

Dr. Kauffman has this to say at line 30:

"The other thing I want to make sure you understand is what happens when you give a dose of digoxin particularly when you give it by mouth. This depends to some degree on the way the digoxin is prepared, whether it is a tablet or a liquid preparation..."

And we are talking about the case being discussed here; that is the Murphy case, which was a liquid preparation.

"When you give a liquid preparation of digoxin the solution is relatively rapidly absorbed, and the data that I have seen, concentration after an individual dose, the concentration peaks around one to two hours after the dose and it can be transiently very high. It can be up to fivefold higher than it will be a few hours later because it is absorbed into the blood and then it distributes out of the blood back into the tissues out



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the body and strictly eight hours after the dose then the concentration in the blood or the serum is in equilibrium with, not equivalent to but in equilibrium with the other tissues in the body and will reflect what we call a steady state situation so that if a patient is on getting a dose of digoxin twice and has been receiving that dosage for months to years, what you will see if you plot the concentration of the digoxin in the serum is on this axis, and time after the dose on this axis is at the time of the dose say we have a digoxin level of one left over from the previous dosage in equilibrium to all the tissues, but you give him a dose and the level will, let's say this level up here is five..."

He is obviously looking at a board.

"...the concentration in the serum will transiently go up as it is absorbed and then over the next six to eight hours gradually come down to the level



where it started here until the next
dose and it will go up and level
out here. And this is why routinely
we always recommend that the digoxin
level if it is drawn for monitoring
patient treatment, helping patient
care, not be drawn here"

And he is indicating a part of his body I think.

"...because that will give you erroneously elevated concentrations that you can't interpret. We try to always try to draw it eight to twelve hours after the dose. We are sure it is reflecting the concentration in the system that is in equilibrium with all that is bound out in the tissues.

- Q. You are talking about somebody is alive?
- A. Yes, I am talking now about general use of digoxin in a patient.
- Q. Right.
- A. I am just trying to give an idea as to how this drug behaves in the body.



"Q.	•	A	very	quick	rise	and	the
а	slow	dro	or	decay:	?		

A. This is over a period of eight hours. This usually occurs one to two hours and then by six to eight hours it goes down to the base line again. This is on a patient who is given the same dose for a long time. Any other questions?"

Now, first of all, does that reflect

a cardiologist's,a cardiologist with your experience, understanding of how digoxin operates?

A. Yes.



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
Q. Now, at page 12 - it's too bad a pharmacologist wasn't called early but we have to do it this way. At page 12 Dr. Kauffman says this, and I read part of this earlier but I want to read the whole passage to get your view about it:

> "Q. And how, as a matter of general medicine, this..."

And this is a question:

"...apart from any specific hospital policy, as a matter of general medicine, is it usual for a doctor, a cardiologist, to order periodic digoxin level tests?"

"A. You mean on a routine or on a regular basis? Well, that's -- I wouldn't say it is. It is not a routine thing. It is really at the discretion of a physician based on the patient and the patient's condition and everything that is going on clinically. It is something that is used selectively like any other laboratory examination to help you in specific situations."



D2

Would you agree that that, Dr.

Rowe, was the clinician's approach to serum level testing at the relevant time?

A. Yes. I think it varies a little bit with the experience of the physician.

Q. Yes.

And then Dr. Kauffman goes on at

the same page:

"It would not be unusual for a child who is doing quite well, who is receiving digoxin and getting along perfectly okay, not to have the digoxin ever measured. On the other hand, if the child is showing symptoms that it might be toxic, you don't know, you might want to measure. So it is in general use. It is sort of a selective thing at the discretion of the physician."

Do you agree with that as a state-

ment of the clinician's approach?

A. Yes. I think that is a reasonable statement.

Q. And then:

"I don't want to ask you to pretend



to know what hospital policy was at the Hospital for Sick Children for a routine test or not for digoxin, but I think you know from the chart that there were weekly tests ordered for Gary Murphy."

He, of course, as we have said, died after the epidemic period.

"A. I am aware of that. I assume there were specific reasons for doing that and didn't question it particularly."

"Q. The signs of toxicity, especially on an infant, if you had vomiting, which we have heard from a previous witness, poor feeding, irritability, are these necessary things which would hold up a red flag to you and say, aha, there is digoxin toxicity present?"

And I am not going to read all this passage because I read it before, and that is the passage in which Dr. Kauffman said that these symptoms, vomiting, sudden onset and so on, can be associated with a myriad of other things in an infant of this age.



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Do you recall me reading that on your first day?

- Α. Yes, I do.
- And that is the clinician's understanding and experience?
 - Very much so.
 - 0. Yes.

MR. STRATHY: Mr. Commissioner, as Mr. Scott has finished in this particular area, I just wanted to raise one matter.

MR. SCOTT: Well, I'm not, but raise the matter.

MR. STRATHY: Do you mind if I interject at this point then?

Mr. Scott indicated to the witness that the levels in Murphy; that is, Gary Murphy, were 4.9 pre-mortem and 18 or 20 post mortem.

My understanding differs from that based on a reading of the Murphy Inquest transcript, and I concede it is not the best record that we might have, but my understanding is that the pre-mortem level, which was taken sometime prior to death; that is, the 4th of April, the death being the 23rd of April, the last pre-mortem reading was 1.5 nanograms and not 4.9, and that the 4.9 reference that Mr. Scott is



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referring to is a greater-than-4.9 reference that was taken post mortem, and the reference for that is in Dr. Kauffman's evidence at page 18, and that in fact the post mortem readings - well, there were readings in the 18 to 20 range, there was also a reading of 32 nanograms in the heart and 24.5 in the right atrium and 29 in the right ventricle.

Now, maybe we can clarify that between Mr. Scott and myself.

MR. SCOTT: I don't know that anything turns on it.

MR. STRATHY: It may not.

MR. SCOTT: But I think it is true that the 4.9 reading may have been post mortem and was diluted, but I don't know and if my friend says that that is what his reading of the transcript reveals, I defer to it.

THE COMMISSIONER: The only thing I want to say is I would like to encourage the use of ante mortem as opposed to pre-mortem. I don't know about anybody else but I use initials for everything and I put 'pm' and if that turns out to be both premortem and post mortem, we are going to be in trouble.

So, I think, if you don't mind, everybody will try to use ante mortem. Besides 'mortem'



D6

is Latin and 'ante' is Latin and I don't know what 'pre' is.

MR. STRATHY: If I do 'am' and 'pm' I get confused with morning and afternoon.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, but I think we can probably distinguish the two somewhere along the line.

MR. SCOTT: I get confused with 'am' and 'pm', too, and all this cutting into my time. Mr. Strathy. I want to finish quickly so we can get a new face up here.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR. SCOTT: But I will try and do

that, sir.

Q. Then, Dr. Kauffman goes on

at page 13:

"A level will give you, can help you if it is within the 'therapeutic range'. You can dismiss it as being a factor in the symptomatology. If the level in a baby this age is higher than that, you know, 3 or 4 milligrams per mill, it may not be causing the symptoms and sometimes you make that judgment in retrospect



D7 2

if you decrease the dose and the symptoms go away when the concentration is reduced But that is, it/most helpful if you can document that the digoxin level is not particularly elevated and then you can assume the symptoms are due to something else."

And is that the clinician's

approach and experience?

A. I think in general, as long as there isn't an electrolyte disturbance as well.

Q. Yes.

Then at page 19, Dr. Kauffman says - the question is "Okay" and then he says:

"One thing I should say, I don't
mean to interrupt you, the post
mortem, the general principle, is it not
the post mortem digoxin levels are
always, are often higher or may
be higher than the reading of a
person who is alive?"

That's the question:

"A. Generally that is true, yes."

"Q. How high can it multiply by



D8

this multiplier effect?"

"A. Well, the data published stated, that I have seen, it depends on the location, the type of sample, the time after death and so forth. I have seen data where it has been documented where it had certainly tripled from pre-mortem levels.

Whether it can more than triple, I am not certain."

"Q. Mr. Cimbura said yesterday..."

That must be the same Mr. Cimbura that we know.

"Mr. Cimbura said yesterday that it could even quadruple perhaps."

"A. I would accept his word on that. The information that I have seen is that it can be anywhere from one and-a-half to threefold greater than the pre-mortem concentration."

Now, Doctor, I have two questions:

At the present time, is that your understanding about post mortem readings in digoxin and the understanding of other like cardiologists?

A. In this rapidly changing



world, I think I can say that it is, but I'm not --

0. Now --

I'm sorry. Α.

MR. LAMEK: Let him finish.

MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry.

Because it seems to me that the knowledge in this area is changing all the time. But that is my general understanding.

> 0. All right.

Did you have any knowledge about the escalation of post mortem values during the epidemic period?

No, I had no knowledge about Α. post mortem levels at all in that period.

0. What about other cardiologists of like experience, did they have knowledge during the epidemic period of post mortem values of digoxin?

Well, there have been papers Α. published on it, I understand, by other cardiologists, other perdiatric cardiologists, but I wasn't particularly familiar with any of that.

Q. All right.

Then at page 42, Dr. Kauffman says this in response to a question - and I don't think it

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is helpful to read - it is quite long:

"Let me rephrase what I hope I can communicate."

That's a sentence I am going to just write down and put it in my pocket.

"Let me rephrase what I hope I can communicate. I think very little is known about the factors that control digoxin distribution and binding in the body and when you look at the literature on concentration in the tissues, they tenfold in infants even without this kind of severe situation. So there is a lot we don't know."

"A. And what I am saying is, I think that between April 4th and the time Gary died, his deterioration and his condition was such that it resulted in a redistribution of digoxin in his body such that he may have had premortem levels somewhere between 6 and 10. You know, I am giving you a number but I expect it could have been a range. We don't know what



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it was over 4.8."

I think 4.8 was the pre-mortem level.

"If you can accept that, there is no problem at all in explaining a post mortem level of 20, which is essentially what we are dealing with. You can talk about 18 or 22 or whatever, but we are really dealing in that range, and I really think that is what took place."

Now, Dr. Rowe, I want to ask you two questions: At present, is it within your understanding as a cardiologist, bearing in mind the state of your present knowledge, that pre-mortem levels may escalate in various parts of the body well above the serum level that is obtained within six hours of the dosage?

Do you have any information about that, as Dr. Kauffman outlined it?

A. No, I am not familiar with all of that work. I am aware of the debate that is going on about it. I know of some patients where it has been established that digoxin levels rise while the patient is off digoxin in terminal phases of the disease.



D12

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Q. You see, what Dr. Kauffman I just want to know if you know about this; I am not
asking you to say you do if you don't, but what Dr.
Kauffman was faced with, as I understand it, and he
will be here in due course, was a patient whose last
reading on April 4th was 4.8 and whose post mortem
reading was 18 or 20. Dr. Kauffman says:

"What I am saying is, I think that between April 4th and the time Gary died, his deterioration and his condition was such that it resulted in a redistribution of digoxin in his body such that he may have had pre-mortem levels somewhere between 6 and 10."

Now, are you familiar with that

phenomenom?


A. I am not familiar with it.

I am familiar with the speculation.

Q. Yes, all right.

Well now, you have dug out for me appropriately enough an article that comes from New Zealand, haven't you?

- A. Yes, I have.
- Q. Do you have that in front of



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you?

Α. Yes, I do.

0. And this article is entitled "Serum Digoxin Levels in Neonates, Infants and Children with Heart Disease", and is, as usual, by a cluster of authors.

> Α. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Exhibit 133.

EXHIBIT NO. 133: New Zealand article entitled "Serum Digoxin Levels in Neonates, Infants and Children with Heart Disease".

MR. SCOTT: Q. Now, before we come to the graph to which I want to draw your particular attention in this article, Doctor, can you tell the Commission what this article was about and what its basic conclusions are as you understand them.

Yes. This was a method to examine the correlation between the digoxin administered, the dose of digoxin administered to babies, to children and between the dose and the serum level and to see if they could make further contribution to knowledge about the levels in relation to age particularly. The patients were all those with heart disease on a cardiac ward in a cardiac institution in New Zealand and the vast majority of them had congenital heart

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
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disease. There were no premature infants in the study.

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So, it is a group of babies and they had different dosage schedules which were used and then they had levels taken in the way they have

described under their "Methods" section.

0. Now, what can you tell us is the conclusion, as you understand it, of the paper?

Well, they conclude that Α. under the age of four months the patients had significantly higher serum digoxin levels than older patients.



E/DM/ak

Q. On the same dosage?

A. In the high dose group, particularly, compared with lower dose in older individuals. There were only two patients in the entire series that showed any toxic manifestations, one in the over four months and one under four months. I think their conclusions, they use this information to show that indeed under four months of age the levels for the comparable dosage tend to be high in babies, and they had to address there the question of what the reasons were for that, but that was largely a matter of speculation. They didn't think it was related to renal appearance although that is the commonly held view.

Q. Well now can I take you to two charts in the article, on page 8, in the second column, one under four months of age, and one four to 18 months and older. Can you describe the first chart, Figure 3?

A. Well that, on the vertical axis that shows a serum level of digoxin.

Q. The test?

A. The test.

Q. Yes.

A. And on the horizontal axis



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the maintenance dose of digoxin per day in micrograms. $\text{Q.} \qquad \text{All right.}$

- A. Ranging from 10 to 22.
- Q. And what is the line?

The line is - I think the

line of the average number, I am not sure what - I

Α.

guess that is the line of the ---

Ω. Now, what are the dots?

A. The dots are the individual

Q. Can we place, what is the limit of the therapeutic range in the so-called manual, 2.5?

A. I think in the manual it says over 2.5 one should be suspicious.

Q. Now I take it - or, let me put it this way, can we find out the number of serum tests, in this diagram, that gave readings over 2.5?

A. That would be possible to calculate, I haven't done that, but at the higher levels of dose there is a substantial number above the value.

Q. Just so I know how to do it, do I simply draw a line half way between two and three on the vertical axis?



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A. Yes.

Q. Across the page?

A. Yes.

Q. And then count the dots?

A. Right.

Q. Well I am not going to do it exactly, but it looks to me as if there is somewhere between 10 and 15 readings, serum levels, above 2.5.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, what was the finding with respect to signs of toxicity?

A. Well there was only one patient in that group that had toxic effects and that was a patient and his level is marked with an X.

Q. He is up at 6?

A. Somewhere around 6 micrograms, I'm sorry, 6 nanograms per millilitre, I am sorry.

Q. What toxic symptoms were there for the patients who were 5, 4 and 3?

A. None, according to their description there were none.

 Ω . Did any of them die?

A. I can't be sure, I can't remember whether he puts in mortality or not.

Q. Now Figure 4, I lead at risk,

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but is that the same figure for a different age group?

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A. It is for the older infants, yes. Those levels don't achieve the same level, high

you see on the first chart.

Q. Well now, when you as a cardiologist, and I want you to speak about your profession, prescribe digoxin, are you prescribing it to obtain, in order to induce a serum level?

levels, they don't have the same upward cluster that

A. No, no, I am not.

Q. What are you prescribing it

A. I am prescribing it to have a clinical effect on the degree of heart failure that is present.

 Ω . And how do you measure the clinical effect that you are seeking?

A. By the patient's condition, the improvement, the return of liver size towards more normal range, the disappearance of gallop rhythm, improvement in distress, the rales and so on.

 Ω . Have you heard the expression "a cardiologist doesn't go for a level", he goes for "effect"?

A. That is the principle upon

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which we work.

Q. Are you concerned absent toxic effects, are you concerned about a serum level, absent toxic effects, above 2.5?

A. No. If you ask me how far above 2.5 I might have to make another response.

Q. All right, yes. Well, I won't ask you, but we have asked the question, so see if you can help us.

A. I think I would be prepared to go up to 3.5, and if I found a level of 3.5, as I am sure happens a lot in hospitals, people would be loath to disregard that even in the absence of symptoms.

Q. I have got an agenda here, and I want to ask you to look at a number of cases.

Just so my friends will understand, these are all the cases of which I am aware in which there is a serum level pre-mortem in excess of 2.5 ante mortem.

THE COMMISSIONER: I was just thinking that you would give up that lesson.

MR. SCOTT: I am a slow learner.

Q. I asked you to try and collect, Doctor, and perhaps we can go at this way, I asked you to try and collect the names of the deceased



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babies, for whom there was a serum level about 2.5, or about whom there was any contemporaneously suggestion on the record of digoxin toxicity up to mid March, up to Pacsai, not including Pacsai. Do you remember making that list for me?

A. Well, I took those in whom the question of toxic level, or possibly toxic levels and the therapy might be considered arguable.

Q. And what are the names of those babies?

A. They were Gage, McKeil,
Gosselin, Estrella and Inwood and I think it is
Leith, I'm not quite sure if Leith is one there,
but there is one level amongst many that was higher,
the rest were all right.

Q. I'm just going to ask you to add one name to that list and that is Taylor, have you got the data on Taylor?

A. I can get it.

 $\mbox{Q.} \qquad \mbox{Let me deal with Taylor first}$ then. My record reveals ---

MR. PERCIVAL: Mr. Commissioner,
I am trying to understand, my friend used the word
"mid March" and I wonder where that gets us and what
it excludes of the 36?



MR. SCOTT: Up to the death of Pacsai, the Baby Pacsai.

MR. PERCIVAL: Does it exclude those of babies for which digoxin was not at all prescribed?

MR. SCOTT: Yes, it does. It excludes, actually Inwood died the day after Pacsai, but it excludes Allana Miller and Justin Cook, Justin Cook I think died when my friend's clients were in the building, but it excluded Justin Cook and Allana Miller and Charlon Gardner.

MR. PERCIVAL: What about the ones where digoxin was not prescribed of the 36 and no levels were ever taken?

MR. SCOTT: What I seek to do, I am not looking at this from the perspective of March or later. I am looking at this seeing what the doctors would have contemporaneously known, and I am therefore dealing with all those cases, I hope, in which there is a contemporaneous question raised either by the reading, the antemortem reading, or by some note on the chart. Is it clear what I am now doing?

MR. PERCIVAL: That would seem to exclude those then that even though there may have been digoxin found at a later time for which they



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were never prescribed like Lombardo?

MR. SCOTT: That is correct.

MR. PERCIVAL: Thank you, that is all I wanted to know.

MR. SCOTT: No one in the Hospital knew, and I say this guardedly. I should put it this way, we believe nobody knew that Lombardo had been administered digoxin, if that was the case. I am speaking only to the cardiologists' knowledge contemporaneously.

> MR. PERCIVAL: Thank you.

MR. LAMEK: Shouldn't MacDonald

be added to the list?

MR. SCOTT: Who?

MR. LAMEK: MacDonald.

THE COMMISSIONER: Right now I have forgotten what the question was, if we ever got to the question. The background is bearing in mind all of these babies for whom a question was raised.

> MR. SCOTT: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Presumably with respect to digoxin levels, and what is the question? MR. SCOTT: I am going to ask the Doctor to deal with each of them. Perhaps, have you got Taylor?



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that sort.

mortem.

THE WITNESS: Yes, I have. The
list that I read out concerned those that I though
had levels that could be considered within the
toxic range in the therapeutic management, not
specifically patients who had questions raised by
anybody under the sun.

MR. SCOTT: Q. Okay. So what is your list then, can we just have it again to be sure I understand.

A. I think it is complete but I can be corrected on this.

Q. How is it defined first?

A. As those who had levels of serum - serum levels of digoxin that were in the range of potential therapeutic toxicity.

Q. And what is that range for the purposes of your definition?

A. Above 2.5 or something of

Q. All right. And we are talking of course about antemortem levels?

A. Yes, we are taking about ante

Q. Now can I just ask you to add Taylor to that list for my own purposes?



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A.	If	you	wish	that	Ι	can	add

Ω. Now, the Baby Taylor died, as my record reveals, on July 27th, 1980. There is a note on an ECG to which Mr. Lamek drew your attention that raised a question about dig. toxicity. I think it says "dig. toxicity" and then a question mark. Have you seen that note?

A. That is part of the head nurses ---

MR. LAMEK: It is part of the Radojewski note of the September 5 conference. It is not in the chart.

THE WITNESS: Not in the record.

MR. SCOTT: Q. I'm sorry, I am supposed to use records. Have you reviewed that record?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. From the point of view of Mr. Lamek's concern?

A. Yes.

Q. And what do you have to tell the Commission about it?

A. Well, the electrocardiogram on admission showed some findings which I assume the



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reason for the comment, that is there was some ST segment changes a part of the record that is often affected when digitalis is given.

Q. Can I stop you just there.

There was something in the ECG that an experienced nurse or doctor would see, is that right?

- A. Yes.
- Q. That raised what possibility?
- A. The possibility of digitalis

intoxication.

- Q. Right. Now did you look at the whole record to see if there was any reasonable explanation for that?
 - A. Yes, I did.
 - Q. And what did you find?
 - A. Well, the electrocardiogram

to which I assume reference was made, is one which shows changes that are quite compatible with the underlying malformation and are incompatible with digoxin, in that as far as we are aware no digoxin had been administered at that time. There was an admission electrocardiogram, that is my understanding of the remark.





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That is my understanding of the remark, but of course without all the detailed commentary I can't really say more than that.

Q. You are looking at an admission electrocardiogram?

A. Yes.

Q. What does that tell you?

A. It tells me that the findings on that electrocardiogram in relation to the time in which digoxin was started are not due to digoxin but are due to the malformation effect on the heart.

Q. Well then --

MR. LAMEK: Excuse me. As a matter of interest where is that in the Hospital record, please?

MR. SCOTT: It is your Hospital record.

MR. LAMEK: No, with respect it is your Hospital record which I provided copies and Dr. Rowe so recognized it.

THE WITNESS: I don't know. If it is not in that record because there is no ECG in that record I guess.

MR. LAMEK: I haven't seen one. Could we have Exhibit 43 please?

MR. SCOTT: Q. Do you have an answer to that, Doctor?





MR. LAMEK: Okay.

MR. SCOTT: This is just re-examination

early.

MR. LAMEK: No, I want to know the basis on which the answer is given.

I have a copy of it here, sir. I wonder if Dr. Rowe could help us.

THE WITNESS: Yes. I believe there was no electrocardiogram in this record but there is an electrocardiogram available which has been - which we have photocopies of which were returned to us by the police and it is part of the cardiac --


MR. LAMEK: Is this the zebra pack?

THE WITNESS: -- zebra package, and ordinarily that should be in the record. I am not quite sure why that wasn't.

MR. SCOTT: Q. Well, it is in the zebra package that the police returned to us.

A. They haven't returned it. They have returned a copy of the zebra package.

Q. I see. Well, we will try and get a copy or Mr. Percival can produce the original from the zebra package. Thank you for drawing that to my attention, Mr. Lamek.



And would you make a note, Dr. Rowe? You seem to know better than I what you are supposed to do, which is to produce that.

A. Yes, I will get that.

Q. Or produce a copy. Now, in sum --

MR. PERCIVAL: I will make inquiries, Mr. Commissioner, but I understand the originals have gone back to the Hospital so there may be some breakdown, but we will find this out. Thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

MR. SCOTT: Q. Now, in sum, Dr. Rowe, what then is your conclusion about the possibility of digoxin toxicity in the baby Taylor bearing in mind what you knew before 1981?

A. I find no evidence of digoxin toxicity.

Q. Now can we deal with the baby

Gage who died according to my notes on September 25th,

and the question I am going to ask you is to just

deal with the history bearing in mind my question is

going to be is there any evidence in the record up

to that baby's death that raises a reasonable question

of the possibility of digoxin toxicity causing or

contributing to death?

A. In Baby Gage there were a number



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of digoxin measurements taken and there were some symptoms that suggested that it might be wise to withhold the digoxin with some vomiting.

Q. Yes.

A. And that was done. Although the level at around that time - I think there was some question about whether there was a level of 1.9. I am not certain - I don't have the Hospital record here.

Q. Would it be helpful to have the Hospital record?

A. I think it might be helpful.

MR. LAMEK: It is Exhibit 61, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: I wonder if we could get them all out.


MR. LAMEK: There was a 1.9 level on September 11.

THE WITNESS: 1.9?

MR. LAMEK: On September 11.

THE WITNESS: On the 11th. But I think it was fair to say that it was because of vomiting that digoxin was withheld on the 19th of September and then resumed, and then on the 24th of September a level was obtained of 3.5 nanograms so that was getting into an area where one might be ...

MR. SCOTT: Q. Can you tell us the time that level was taken?





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A. I will have to look.

MR. LAMEK: Page 126 I think.

THE WITNESS: 146?

MR. LAMEK: 126.

THE WITNESS: The level was at four o'clock in the afternoon.

MR. SCOTT: Q. On September 24th?

A. Yes.

Q. And the level was 3.5?

A. 3.5, yes.

Q. Now was digoxin cut off?

A. Digoxin was withheld for about a total of 24 hours before the death of the patient.

Q. All right. Now can you tell us - the patient died on the 25th?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us when on that day the patient died? What time?

A. It was 0400 hours.

Q. All right. Now one other fact: you have told us that the reading was taken at 4 p.m. Can you tell us when the preceding digoxin dose would have been?

A. It should have been I think at 0900 but I will have to look. I think the sheet for that is missing, is it not?





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Let's deal with what you have. What you have told us as I understand it is this. At 4 p.m. on the 24th there was a digoxin reading of 3.5.

> A. Yes.

0. The record reveals that digoxin was terminated.

A. I think that I have a note Yes. here that there was no digoxin after 0530 on the 24th?

> 0. All right.

A. I don't see where I got that

Q. The point I am making, though, is after the serum level there certainly was no digoxin administered according to the record?


> A. No.

0. And the baby died how many hours

A. 24 hours after the last dose.

Now what conclusion do you draw 0. from that on the question of whether there is on the record a reasonable question about digoxin toxicity in the case of Baby Gage?

I think that one would not expect digoxin toxicity to account for the death on the basis of that evidence.





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0. Why?

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Because the level was not extraordinarily high.

> 0. Yes.

And because the digoxin had been withheld and there were no other symptoms until the time of death I think.

Had been withheld for 23 hours or 0. so?

A. Something like that. I am not absolutely sure. I would have to check this business about symptoms.

I draw your attention --

Feeding well I think. Oh, no, sorry, did vomit once on that day.

I draw your attention to Dr. Kauffman's evidence that the digoxin dissipates over 8 to 10 to 12 hours. Does that have any part in the conclusion that you are drawing?

A. Yes. We would have expected that the digoxin level with digoxin withheld should fall and we would predict that any question of symptoms related to digoxin toxicity would have been resolved in that period of time.

> 0. Then looking at the record in



Baby Gage is there anything there at all that you can draw our attention to that suggests a reasonable possibility in that record of digoxin toxicity as cause of death?

A. No.

THE COMMISSIONER: We have used up your time. I haven't kept a stopwatch on it but I would like to give you some more time but can we have that after the break? We will take 20 minutes.

--- Short recess.



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MR. SCOTT: Q. Well, Dr. Rowe, I am living on borrowed time, so we better get on


Have you said everything you wanted to say about Baby Gage?

- Yes, I think so.
- Can we turn now to Baby Q. McKeil? My note is that that baby died on October 15, 1980. Can we again, by your characterizing in a short sentence or two just to bring it all back, the problem that confronted this baby?

This was a baby with trans-Α. position of the great arteries and double outlet right ventricle who had a coarctation of the aorta as well which had been repaired and had an internal arrangement which was very complex and not essentially correctable.

So, the big problems with this baby had been repeated failure and a lot of difficulty with vomiting and poor intake.

- Q. And on both classification systems, that is a high risk baby?
 - Yes.
 - Q. Well, perhaps we can begin



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about a month before the baby died. My note is that on September 16th there was a serum level done which produced a reading of 4.6.

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Can you tell when the dose

was given?

A. Well, I may not be correct but my interpretation is that the dose was given 25 minutes before that, but I may be wrong.

THE COMMISSIONER: Where do you

get that?

on 159.

THE WITNESS: I've got to find the page, Mr. Commissioner.

MR. LAMEK: The level is shown

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. PERCIVAL: Mr. Commissioner, could we have the exhibit number for the record?

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, it is

Exhibit 62.

MR. PERCIVAL: Thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: 16th of

September at 9:25. Is that the time when --

THE WITNESS: 9:25 was the time

that the sample was obtained. The question is when



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the dose was given. I have a note that it was given at 9:00 a.m., but I am trying to find that.

MR. SCOTT: Q. All right. Let's leave it there. We are a month before the baby's death and I don't need to pursue it at this stage.

What was decided to be done with respect to digoxin following that serum level?

A. I'm sorry, I don't have that

Q. Well, let me summarize, and I think I have got it correct, and we are not down to anywhere near the baby's death yet, but I understand that there is a note in the record that digoxin was held.

A. Held, I'm sorry. Yes, held. Hold one dose.

- Q. All right. Hold one dose?
- A. That's what it says.
- Q. And would that be a response

to the reading?

A. I presume it was, though I am just a bit surprised in light of the -- if my interpretation of the time at which the dose was given and the level, and the time at which the level was taken is correct, then there would be, in my view,



early after the dose?

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no	particular	reason	to	withhold	the	digoxin
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Q. Is that because of what Dr. Kauffman says; that you are taking a reading too

A. Yes.

Q. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: I would think if you take it almost too early, even if it was five minutes, it wouldn't have any effect at all.

THE WITNESS: 25 minues.

MR. SCOTT: It's 25 minutes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Oh, 25 minutes.

I thought you said five minutes.

THE WITNESS: Well, you know, I will have to check that, but that was my interpretation. I may be wrong.

MR. LAMEK: Does page 90 help you,

Doctor?

MR. SCOTT: Q. In any event, a highly conservative course was adopted in the sense that the digoxin was withheld?

A. Yes.

Q. And are you telling the Commission that, bearing in mind when the dose was given and when the serum level was taken, you, yourself,



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would not have	withheld	the digoxin at that	stage
	Α.	I think probably t	hat is
correct, yes.			
	Q.	In this baby is di	goxin
necessary for i	ts life ?		
	Α.	Oh, yes.	

 Ω . Now, can I take you down to the next serum level, which I think is October 3rd, when there was a serum level of 3.4.

MR. LAMEK: September 24th.

MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry, I may have

the wrong date.

what they are?

MR. LAMEK: And it was 2.5.

THE WITNESS: There are two other readings between that point and the 3.4, but they are both within the usual range.

MR. SCOTT: Q. Can you give us

A. 2.5 on the 24th of September

and 1.9 on the 28th.

Q. Yes. And the baby continues on digoxin?

- A. Yes.
- Q. And what is the next reading?
- A. The next one I have is on the



3rd of October, 3.4.

Q. Yes. Can you tell how long after dosage that serum level was taken?

A. Well, again, that needs checking but my understanding is that it was one hour after the dose.

Q. In your opinion, bearing in mind Dr. Kauffman's account, has that any implications for the serum level itself?

A. Yes.

 Ω . What would it do to it?

A. It would make it falsely

elevated.

 $\mathbb{Q}.$ Yes. Well now, what happens after that, Dr. Rowe?

A. Well, the levels remain. I think the next level was the 6th of October. There was some, because that level nevertheless — the residents withheld the digoxin initially and restarted it on the 5th of October, and the level on the 6th was 1.2, the level on the 8th was 1.3 and the level on the 14th at 0940 hours was greater than 4.7.

Q. Yes.

A. Now, that level was obtained, by my reading, at three and-a-half hours or three hours and forty minutes after the dose was administred.



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2	Q. Well, what was done when that
3	reading was obtained?
4	A. The digoxin was discontinued
5	at that point. But, again, I think it may represent a
6	rather inflated value, though we don't know quite what
7	it was.
	Q. All right. And we don't know
8	precisely what the value was because it's greater-than
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. But the response was to
11	discontinue digoxin?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. Is that a decision of which
14	you approve, or would have taken yourself?
	A. Yes, I think so.
15	Q. Yes. And what happened next?
16	A. The digoxin, I think, was
17	not given again.
18	Q. Well, the baby died the
19	following day.
20	A. Yes.
21	Q. Can you tell us what time the
	baby died?
22	A. Well, on my note, it is 0427.
23	I don't know whether that is absolutely correct.



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				Q.	That	is	what	Ι	have.	And	that
would	be	on	the	15th.							

Is there any evidence in the record that digoxin was administered after the reading taken at 9:40 a.m. on the morning of October 14th?

A. No.

Q. No. Now, I think you told us that the dosage would have been about three hours earlier; is that what you said?

THE COMMISSIONER: Three hours and forty minutes before the test.

MR. LAMEK: Three hours and forty minutes.

MR. SCOTT: All right.

Q. So, is there any evidence in the record that another dosage of digoxin was given between 6:00 a.m. on October 14th and the death of the baby at 4:27 on the morning of the 15th?

A. No.

Q. Now, I have calculated it but, subject to what everybody else calculates, that means that the baby died some 22 hours after the last recorded dosage of digoxin?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any communication,



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as	far	as you	know	from	the	record,	with	the	parents
of	the	baby?							

A. Yes. I think the parents were told that the levels were at the toxic range.

Q. And that would refer to the level taken on the morning of the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they told, or would they, in the normal course, have been told that digoxin was being cut out?

A. Yes.

 Ω_{ullet} Yes. Would a cardiologist or a resident have discussed with them the consequences of that?

- A. I think so. I'm not sure.
- Q. And what are the consequences?
- A. That though the level was

high and the precise level might not have been known, by discontinuing digoxin was the appropriate way to bring the level down.

Q. Yes.

A. And I don't know whether they went into the question of the perhaps spurious elevation because of the sampling time.

Q. Well now, you formed an opinion



sometime after that about the cause of this baby's death?

A. Yes.

 Ω_{\bullet} Based on the information that you obtained by talking to the cardiologists and the record, and you told Mr. Lamek that.

Is there any evidence in this record which would lead any reasonable cardiologist to suspect that the digoxin was the cause of death?

A. No. I think I have said before that we can't rule out some contribution but that I would have expected that not to be the cause of death.


Q. And I take it that if there is some contribution, are you speaking of a contribution that is reflected by the serum level reading on October 14th at 9:40?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes.

Now, leaving aside what you know about what happened in March, is there anything that up to the end of the year changes your opinion about how Baby McKeil died?

A. No.



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			Q.	•	Nov	√ ,	can	we	turn	to	Gosselin
ve	you	got	that	in	front	of	you	1?			

- A. Yes, I have.
- Q. Now just to lead you a bit, my understanding is that that baby was transferred from Winnipeg, that was your evidence?
 - A. That's true.
- Q. And arrived in the Hospital on December the 17th?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. And died on December the 18th?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And can you just tell us once again in a sentence or two, your assessment of the baby's admission condition?
- A. This baby was critically ill with an extremely severe coarctation of the aorta. It was almost a complete interruption of the aorta, and had a mild degree of underdevelopment of the left ventricle as well. So it was a very severe patient, severe condition with extreme heart failure which had been treated in Winnipeg and recognized as something that needed surgical treatment that could not be done there. So the baby was transferred at 3 o'clock in the morning arrived at the Hospital



for Sick Children.

Q. Yes.

A. It was started on treatment.

It was not started on any digoxin because digoxin in moderately high doses had been administered to the baby in Winnipeg, the last dose being some eight hours before arrival.

Q. About 7:00 p.m.?

A. Yes. We were I think - when I say "we", the cardiologists involved were concerned about the state of profusion of this baby, the question of how much renal profusion there might be, because this is a condition where there is a great likelihood of impairment of profusion of organs below the area of the coarctation and so they didn't give any more digoxin.

Q. Does the record reveal that this baby received any digoxin at Sick Children's Hospital?

A. I don't believe there is any record of that.

Q. Was a serum level taken some time after the baby arrived from Winnipeg?

A. The level was taken at the time of the initial examination at, I think 4:30,



that is an hour and a half after arri	val.
---------------------------------------	------

- Q. And what was that level?
- A. That level was 3.7.
- Q. And I take it that the

determination was made not to administer digoxin?

- A. Yes.
- Q. Well now, what happened to the baby, when did the baby die?
- A. The baby died at 03.17 by my list on the 18th, which is about 24 hours after arrival.
- Q. Some 32 hours after the last known digoxin administration?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. What was the pattern of the baby's life as it approached death?
- heart failure recognized and that wasn't surprising, and had to be treated with diuretics, more diuretics and was being treated with prostaglandins to try and open up the ductus although that didn't appear to be working. So we had the position of a very sick infant who was getting worse and whom we were not able to give more digoxin, and there was some improvement temporarily with lasix, but then the onset of the



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final episode in the early hours of the morning.

Q. Let me ask you this, in a case like that where the baby is given a serum level of 3.7, no, I have got it wrong, it doesn't matter, but the baby is, you know, in the intervening period and up to 24 hours later is obviously very close to death, would any consideration be given, notwithstanding the readings some 24 hours before of taking a chance to give it more digoxin to perserve its life?

Well that might be a

consideration, but most people are unwilling to do
that, but it is a dilemma in this group of patients.

Because where the profusion of the kidneys is so
grossly impaired then there is the possibility of
the levels in the blood becoming even higher. It is
a difficulty that we run into in this severity illness.
You have to give digoxin in order to get any benefit
in the baby. And yet you run some risk that if the
profusion of the kidney is going to decrease steadily
that the levels could rise. It is a very difficult
dilemma therapeutically and one in which you have
to make choices and hope that the choice will be
the correct one.

Q. And the choice made here, as the record reveals was to hold digoxin?



Y	e	S	
	Y	Yе	Yes

Q. Looking at the Gosselin baby, is there any evidence on the record, looking at the baby after its death and looking at its history and its treatment, is there any evidence on that record that suggests to a reasonable cardiologist that digoxin may have played any part in the baby's death?

A. I don't think we can exclude the possibility but I don't think it was the major inference at all.

Ω. All right.

A. I would think that that level is not at a danger point, but I cannot say what it might not have been like just before the death.

Ω. So what you are saying, if

I have it right, is that the possibility that the

therapeutic dose administered in Winnipeg, at the

Winnipeg Hospital, held on and made some, might

have made some contribution to the baby's death?

A. Yes, especially since as we have already heard, there is more and more information coming out about the shedding of digoxin, or septus and so on. I don't think that is anything proven yet but I think it is something that might perhaps even today sway us a little more in that direction.



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And can we turn now to the Baby Estrella who died on January the 11th, 1981, and I want you to look at this case for the moment as you would have looked at it on the record and without the postmortem examination.

Mr. Commissioner, I can tell you, if it is of any help, that the evidence is, at the Preliminary Inquiry, that the postmortem results were available I think two weeks later, that is the postmortem results were available to the pathologists two weeks later.

So look at this case as you would have looked at it in the week or so succeeding the baby's death, looking only at the record. What can you tell us about the Baby Estrella? First of all, had that baby been on digoxin for a long period of time?

Α. Yes, it had. She was the baby with Down's Syndrom and had a repair of an atrial ventricular defect which is a major defect of the septa of the heart and the valve, common valve between the atria and the ventricles, and had a very considerable amount of trouble post-operatively because of persistence of congestive heart failure, which in the end was believed to be the consequence



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of rather major mitral valve regurgitation, or leakage.

Q. Was digoxin therapy necessary for this baby's life?

A. Yes, it was.

 Ω . Now this baby was admitted

I think in December, is that correct?

A. The 14th of December.

Q. And was the baby on digoxin

therapy?

A. I believe so, yes.

Q. And were levels were taken

in December?

A. I am not sure, I would have to look at that.

Q. Well I think I can come on without the necessity of going as far back as December.

MR. LAMEK: Page 152, Doctor, it's the reading of December the 22.



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THE WITNESS: Digoxin level, thank you,

Mr. Lamek --

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MR. LAMEK: I am sorry.

THE WITNESS: -- on the 22nd of

December.

MR. LAMEK: On 162.

THE WITNESS: On page 162, 1.5 nanograms.

MR. LAMEK: That is the only one I see.

THE WITNESS: And there were more

levels taken in January.

MR. SCOTT: Q. Did something happen on

January 7th?

Yes. I think that there was - I A. am not sure if it was the 7th. Yes, the 7th there was a problem with lethargy.

THE COMMISSIONER: There was a cardiac arrest, was there not?

THE WITNESS: And a 23 was called at about 6:50 in the morning. The heart rate dropped and respiratory rate dropped and the --

MR. SCOTT: Q. Was the baby on digoxin therapy at that time?

On digoxin and the liver was enlarged and the baby required fairly active resuscitation as you may recall. Consideration was


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even given to transfer to the Intensive Care Unit. But at 10:15 a nurse noted that the heart was a little irregular and the digoxin level was drawn then which was greater than 5.

> That is 10:15 on what date? Q.

> A. Well, that is on the 7th of

January.

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And the serum level was greater Q.

than 5?

A. That is what I have here in my

notes.

Q. That was four days before the

baby died?

It was greater than 5 and it was taken at 8:20 on the 7th of January, so it was taken I guess after the arrest or after the near arrest.

Yes. Code 23 is a near arrest; is that it?

> A. Yes.

Did this baby have apnea, one of 0. the conditions you discussed with me on the first day?

Yes, it did have.

Well now, when the reading was obtained on the 7th of greater than 5, what was the reaction as far as you can judge from the record? What was the response to that?



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	A.	Well,	I think	that as	I see it
there was no	digoxin	admini	istered.	It was	on hold
at the time of	of the di	g. lev	vel being	g drawn a	and I think
it was given	again af	ter th	ne 2100 h	nours on	the 6th.

0. The reason I ask the question, Doctor, is my recordkeeping in these 36 cases over nine months reveals that of all the serum levels taken on all these babies greater than 5 for the baby Estrella four days before her death is the largest serum reading up till that time?

Yes. I am not sure what greater than 4.9 may be inferred as.

> 0. Oh, yes. I am sorry about that.

> A. Presumably about the same inter-

0. I was looking at the number again rather than the greater sign.

Now what was the response to this reading?

A. Well, digoxin had been on hold from the 6th I believe. 6th of January, and I don't believe there is any evidence that it was given again after 2100 hours on the 6th.

Q. Does the record reveal then any digoxin administered after 2100 on the 6th?





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it was 32.

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	A.	That	is	my	understanding	of	the
record.							

Q. When you got the greater than 5 level was a kidney test done?

A. I am sorry, I can't answer that immediately.

Q. Well, is a BUN test a kidney test?

A. Yes, B-U-N.

Q. Yes. Was a BUN done?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. When was that done?

A. At least if you say it was, it was.

I have to look at the chart.

Q. Well, you look at the chart.

A. The 7th, on the 7th of January

Q. What does that mean?

A. That is elevated. It means that the renal function is impaired.

Q. What does that mean if anything in relation to the reading of greater than 5 of the same day?

A. Well, it would be significant in that it might be accounted for by that.

Q. Just tell us the process. We



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don't ha	ave	to rep	peat	indef	initely,	but	what	is	the
process	by	which	it	might	account	for	it?		

A. Because if it cannot be excreted easily through the kidneysit will be accumulated in the blood.

Q. All right. And digoxin was on hold. Were other serum levels taken?

A. Yes, they were after that. On the next day it was 21 which was at the border line, and then the subsequent levels were low.

Q. These are the BUN tests?

A. Yes. Subsequent levels between the 8th and 10th were within normal range.

Q. All right. So that by the 8th the kidney function seems to be within normal range?

A. Yes.

Q. What about the digoxin serum tests?

A. By the 9th - yes, by the 8th, sorry. Serum digoxin levels on the 8th were greater

than 4.7 and on the 9th 4.7.

Q. And the baby died on January 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. So the last test taken was on

January 9th, 4.7?

A. Yes.



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0. So the last test taken was on January 9th, 4.7?

> A. Yes.

Now, Doctor, you have given the Commission your opinion, your judgment, as to the underlying cause of death in this baby. Is there any evidence in that record that would suggest to a reasonable cardiologist that digoxin toxicity was the underlying cause?

Well, I have said that there may be some contribution but I didn't think that this was the primary problem because the baby had the same dilemma that we had with one other we talked about, congestive heart failure was getting worse.

On the 8th there were notes to that effect, and we can't give more digoxin because the levels were high. There could be an interpretation that the levels are beginning to come down a little over the next few days but we don't know what the level would have been on the 11th.

So it is like Gosselin, you want to give digoxin but you can't?

> A. Yes.

Q. Is that right?

A. Yes.



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		Q.	A	nd	in	this	case,	as	the	record
reveals	at	least,	you	did	ln't	afte	er the	6tł	1?	

A. No.

Q. Well now --

A. So the problem here is how much of a contribution if any digoxin had towards death.

We were pretty convinced that the failure was the key factor, and that was reinforced by the staff cardiologist who was involved with that baby, and there are no symptoms during the 9th and the 10th that would strongly suggest digoxin was a problem because the baby's heart rate was regular; there were no suggestions of anything that might point strongly towards that the level was climbing up. So that really in the last day or so there is no evidence to suggest digoxin toxicity.

Q. Can we now turn to Baby Inwood?

My note reveals, Doctor, that this baby died on March

13th at 0300, and had been admitted on March 11 so

the baby had been in the Hospital about two days. The

baby was 18 days old at its date of death. And can

you just tell us in capsule the problem with that

baby again?

A. The problem was coarctation of the aorta with associated anomaly of a bicuspid aortic valve and ductus arteriosus.



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). Is that a high level risk

A. That is a moderately high level but not very high.

Q. All right. Can you tell us what you know from the record about the administration of digoxin? Isn't this the case when the digoxin was dosed early?

- A. There was an error in the diagnosis.
- Q. Where there was the incident

report?

- A. Yes, I believe that is true.
- Q. Just if it helps you find it in the record, my note is that digoxin should have been given on March 12th at nine but was given instead at 5:30 a.m.

I am sorry, my friends are correcting me here. Perhaps I had better let you tell us about Inwood. But I have got this deadline; the Judge wants to see a new face here.

A. I think the situation, to try
and accelerate that, was that at 0600 on the 12th of
March an order was written to withhold the next four
doses and digoxin level ordered for that afternoon,
and I presume that that relates to the error, the time
of the administration of the error.





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	Q.	So	when	does	the	last	digoxin
dministration	appear	: to	have	e beer	1?		

A. At the time when whatever that dose was was given.

Q. 0600?

A. I don't know when that was given.

That was when the doctor wrote the order.

THE COMMISSIONER: 0530.

MR. SCOTT: I have 0530 and these people are all saying no, no, you are wrong.

MR. PERCIVAL: I think that was the one that was in fact given at 5:30 by mistake. It was supposed to be given to another baby but was given to this particular baby and that was the basis of the incident report; not that it was given early.

THE WITNESS: I don't think you can tell that from the record.

MR. SCOTT: Well, Mr. Percival is giving evidence too.

MR. PERCIVAL: No, the incident report is in. You put it in, Mr. Scott.

THE COMMISSIONER: It is Exhibit 113A and it tells us whatever it does tell us, but I read this as digoxin was given when it shouldn't have been given at all. Isn't that what that report seems to say?



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THE WITNESS: No, digoxin was ordered.
THE COMMISSIONER: Well, it may have
peen ordered but the team leader asked the nurse to
give digoxin to the patient proper identification
not used. High stress. Ward extremely busy. This
s 113A. Have you got that, Doctor?
THE WITNESS: No, I don't.
THE COMMISSIONER: Anyway, does this
matter to your question?
MR. SCOTT: What I want to get, and I
chink I have it:

Digoxin appears to have been administered at 5:30 a.m. on the 12th.

THE COMMISSIONER: I can answer that question.

MR. SCOTT: And the answer is yes, isn't it?

THE COMMISSIONER: And the answer is yes. MR. SCOTT: Q. All right, we will move along, Dr. Rowe. This combination agreed on the facts. It is just overwhelming.

Does the record reveal that any other digoxin was given to this baby before it died?

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I don't think that was, no. Α.

0. All right. Does the record reveal that in the light of the dosage problem a serum level was taken at 900 hours.

> Α. Yes.

0. And what was the level?

Α. The level was 2.6.

0. Do you have any comment on that level in light of the fact that the digoxin was administered at 5:30?

Yes. Well, that would be earlier than you would expect a sample to be taken because of the time relationship of the acute phase distribution of the drug. Now, I would nevertheless interprete that meaning that if a level had been taken at true time the value would not have been excessively elevated.

Well now, everyone regards the error that lead to this, of course, but at that moment when you know the mistake has been made and when you know what the serum level is and when the order is given 'no more digoxin' is there anything to be alarmed about by virtue of the administration of the digoxin?

> Α. I would not have interpreted

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to meet them.

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any alarm on the basis of that level.

THE COMMISSIONER: You said the level

was 2.6?

THE WITNESS: 2.6, yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: 2.6.

THE WITNESS: And it was at three and a half hours after the dose.

Q. Now, my note is that the baby died at 0300 on the 13th?

A. Yes.

 Ω_{ullet} That would be between 21 and 22 hours after the digoxin administration?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes. Now, you have told the Commission your opinion as to the cause of death of this baby. Is there any evidence in this record that would suggest to a reasonable cardiologist like yourself that digoxin has anything to do with it?

A. No.

THE COMMISSIONER: I just wonder if there are any unreasonable cardiologists?

MR. SCOTT: If there are, we're going

MR. STRATHY: We'll see some of them!
MR. SCOTT: Now, can we deal with



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Baby Leith, who died, as I understand it, on March 6th, at 10:30 in the morning and who had been admitted on January 31st.

So, this baby had just been in the hospital about five weeks. At death, the baby was 42 days old. Now, subject to those facts being correct, can you summarize in a sentence or two, just to remind us of the nature of this baby's ailment?

A. This was a baby with a complete atrio-ventricular defect, meaning a major communication at both atrial and ventricular levels on a common valve. In addition had coarctation of the order for which there had been treatment, a small left ventrical and some degree of sub-aortic stenosis.

which it was very questionable whether survival would be possible but the initial operation was gone ahead with, with the hope that possibly that might not be true. And the baby came back to the ward eventually progressing poorly with continuing and worsening heart failure and because of the deterioration it was felt that there should be no act of resusitation, so, in effect, a 'do not resusitate' order was agreed upon by the family with Dr. Izukawa.

Q. Yes. Well now, I put this baby



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on the list because I understand that while -- first of all, do I understand that digoxin was necessary to this baby's life?

A. Yes, digoxin was being administered for that reason.

Q. And that at least until March the 2nd, the serum levels that were obtained appeared to be lower than 2.5?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, I raise the question about this baby because on March 2nd, as I have it, there was a serum level -- this is four days before the baby died -- of the figure 2.8?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me what was decided following the production of that serum level?

A. I'm just looking to see
whether any action was taken. I think digoxin was
held because of a question I think in relation to
irregularity. I can't recall whether there was
irregularity of the heart beat or seizures but it was
one or the other.

Q. All right.

A. And the digoxin was held for that evening and to be reassessed.




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3	Q. That's the evening of March 2nd?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. Yes.
6	A. And to be reassessed. No, I'm
7	sorry, in the early morning of the 2nd of March until
	the digoxin level was known. So, for two days the
8	digoxin was witheld.
9	Q. And which two days are that,
10	just so that we know?
11	A. For the 3rd well, for the
12	rest of the 2nd and the 3rd and it was started again
13	on the 4th.
14	Q. All right. Now, after it was
15	started again was it started at a normal level,
16	bearing in mind the nature of this patient's condition?
7	A. It was started at a slightly
18	lower level than before but not vastly different.
1	Q. All right. Was a subsequent
19	serum level taken?
20	A. No, the only level that was
21	taken was one on I'm sorry, on the 5th there was one
22	of 2.1.
	Q. All right. Now, that's pretty

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Α.	That's	within	the	normal	range

Q. Yes. And that's the day before the baby died.

A. Yes.

Q. Was a decision made about digoxin on March 6th, the very day of the baby's death?

A. Yes, the digoxin was withheld again.

Q. Let me ask you about this. Would there have been a dose of digoxin between the serum reading on March 5th of 2.1 and the determination to withold it?

A. I can't see that here, immediately.

Q. Well, I don't want to trouble you with it. I take it that on March 6th the decision was made to hold the digoxin?

A. I will have to look at the notes, I'm sorry to delay you.

Q. No, no.

A. Yes, hold the next dose of digoxin, and that was written at 6:15 on the 6th of March.

Q. And was any other digoxin, as

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far as the record reveals, given to the baby between that note and its death?

A. No.

Q. Was any serum sample taken between the one on March 5th and the baby's death?

A. No, not that I'm aware of.

Q. You have told us that digoxin was necessary for this baby's life. Why did you make a determination to stop the digoxin on the morning of March 6th, when your previous serum sample had been within normal ranges?

A. I'm not sure. I'm not sure of the reason for that decision. It was a decision made by the fellow in cardiology and the resident. The baby was worse and they wondered about pulmonary edema.

Q. Is that one of the causes that you and I talked about four years ago, or whenever it was that we began this?

A. Yes, yes. And I think that it is hard to read into the mind of the fellow what he was thinking about here. The potassium level was a little on the high side and that may have been the reason. The digoxin level he knew to be around 2.1, so, I think they just -- I don't know exactly why they discontinued with the digoxin but at that stage,



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they had made up their mind they weren't going to resusitate in any event. I'm not sure.

Q. Well now, looking at the death of Baby Leith on the record and with the knowledge you would have had before Pacsai, is there any evidence from which our reasonable cardiologist would be concerned about the possibility of digoxin toxicity contributing to death?

- I don't think so in that case.
- 0. All right. First of all, I take it it was stopped at the critical time?
 - Α. Yes.
- And the last reading had been Q. within the normal range?
 - Α. Yes.
- Now, I'm going to ask Mr. Ortved to deal with some other matters that I know he wants to cover, and so, I will move right along here.

MR. ORTVED: I guess I will crossexamine then, Mr. Chairman.

MR. SCOTT: I'm almost finished.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. No, that's fine. I think you had always threatened us with that, Mr. Ortved.



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MR. SCOTT: Well, Mr. Ortved is going to deal with the Estrella post mortem and read in, I hope, some material and that was what I was going to do, so, he might as well do it, he's the master of that field.

I just want to ask you one 0. other short series of questions -- two other short series of questions, Doctor.

Were you asked to do some work for the Atlanta people, you know who I mean?

> Α. Yes.

And will you tell the Commission what you were asked to do?

Α. I was asked to make some estimate of the severity and the outlook for some patients that were selected by the centre for assessment in a blind fashion.

Q. All right. Now, severity and outlook is something that we have been talking about here in relation to these 36 babies for three weeks, isn't it?

> Α. Yes.

Q. Yes. How many babies were you asked to assess?

Well, I can't remember exactly



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because I didn't keep records of these babies. I'm sure I wasn't invited to keep records of those babies.

Q. No.

A. But I think that it started by my getting a list of about 63 or so babies.

O. Yes.

A. In which they wanted to test something, I presume my consistency, or whatever, in assessing things. And then I was given a much larger list. In fact, Dr. Freedom also did that.

Q. Did he work with you on this?

A. He worked on this separately and we joined forces on that.

Q. Yes.

A. But then I was asked to -no, I think we did those independently and they were
assessed independently by the CDC. Then I was given
a very much larger --

Q. That was a little test, perhaps to see how prompt you were in mailing in your stuff?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. All right. Then did you get

the workload?

A. Then we got the workload. That made me grow a little pale because it was a huge



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2	number of patients, I've forgotten what the number was.
3	Q. Can you give us an approximate
4	number?
5	A. No, I can't remember but it
6	took me hours and hours to do.
7	Q. Was it a hundred?
8	A. It may have been more than
9	a hundred; probably was more than a hundred.
10	Q. All right.
11	A. I can't remember the exact
li	number because I have no records left of that at all.
12	Q. All right. And I take it you
13	weren't given the names of patients?
14	A. No. What I was given was a
15	very limited amount of information that was a print-
16	out, selected parts of a print-out.
17	Q. Have you got one of those with
18	you?
19	A. No, I'm sorry.
	Q. Well, you showed it to me the
20	other day.
21	A. Yes.
22	Q. Did I ask you to bring it with


A. I don't know that you did.

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you?



I'm sorry, I don't have it.

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Q. You don't have it with you?

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A. No. I will bring it, I will

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get it for you after lunch.

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Q. All right. Well, I take it

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that you weren't told the names of these patients?

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A. No, all that was on the

information sheet was the age of the patient.

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O. Yes.

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A. There were no dates. There

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was the age of the patient, there was a diagnosis.

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Q. In one or two words?

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A. Two lines of diagnosis, I

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believe.

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Q. Yes.

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A. And then there was an indication

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of any investigations that had been made, now not every

Q. Well, what, for example?

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A. For example, there were some

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where there were some that had cardiac catheterization

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Q. They just said cardiac

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catheterization?

noted.

investigation but some.

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A. Cardiac catheterization.

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3	Q. They wouldn't tell you
	anything about what it showed?
4	A. No, no, no.
5	Q. Was there anything else on
6	this little sheet for each baby?
7	A. And I think there was an
8	indication if there was an operation.
9	Q. All right. Did it tell you
	what the operation was for?
10	A. Well, it described the
11	operation, usually.
12	Q. In how many words, two or
13	three words?
14	A. Blalock-Taussig, coarctectomy,
15	or something like that. Enough to tell you what had
	been done.
16	Q. It would give you the name of
17	the operation?
18	A. Yes.
19	Q. And would it be correct to say,
20	we don't have it here, that there for what you had is,
21	you had the age, you had a diagnosis in one or two
	lines?
22	A. Yes.
231	

Q. You had the fact of a catheter



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being done and the name of the surgery if any was done?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. And what were you

supposed to do with that?



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A. I was supposed to come up with a severity status of the patient.

Q. Were you given any choices?

A. No. Well, I was given choices in the way of three or four things. It was rather similar to the New York Heart Association Code but not quite the same.

Q. Were you given a series of numbers and you had to pick one in the severity range?

A. Yes. I think it came in a coding much like the other but not quite the same.

 \mathbb{Q}_{\bullet} Will you bring that sheet this afternoon as a sample?

A. If I can. Now, I am not sure whether that sheet is of the first 63 or whether it is one that --

Q. I don't care about the detail in the sheet. I take it the first 63 were in form and information provided the same as the subsequent bundle?

A. Yes, they were. I'm not sure if the coding changed in any way but it still was a coding somewhat similar to the New York Heart Association.

Q. Were you comfortable performing

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that exercise with that kind of information?

- A. No.
- Q. Why not?
- A. Well, not really comfortable.

I was obliging the people who were investigating because I felt they had decided this was something they needed; that we should do it. But we were not invited into the planning of that manoeuvre.

Q. Why were you uncomfortable

doing it?

A. Because of the limited information that you would have available to make a decision of that sort.

Q. I take it what you would get would be four lines that would represent a file or a record in your hospital that might be an inch thick?

- A. Or more.
- Q. Just two other questions.
 You know Dr. Natas at Boston

Children's?

- A. Yes, I do.
- Q. And do you know Dr. Hastreiter?
- A. Yes, I do.
- Q. And they are both cardio-

logists?

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К3

Α. Yes.

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Q. You are aware that Dr. Natas has done some work for the Atlanta group?

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Α. Yes.

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And you are aware that Dr.

Hastreiter has done some work for, I'm not sure who, the Crown Attorney at least?

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Yes.

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We have asked Mr. Lamek to 0.

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produce -- and I think you know Dr. Natas was asked to evaluate with respect to two phases a number of

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patients?

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Α. Yes.

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We have asked Mr. Lamek, and

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of course it is not his fault but he hasn't yet been able to provide any information or any detail as to what Dr. Natas had before him when he made those evaluations. You have given your opinion about these deaths. Are you in any position, the information state being what it is, to express an opinion about Dr. Natas' work?

Α. Not without, I think, having more detail as to how he planned and analyzed his material.

> You respect his opinion as a Ω.



K4

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cardiologist?

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sioner.

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Α.	Oh,	yes,	of	course
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0. Would you like to hear what he has to say in support of his conclusions?

> Α. Yes.

0. Would you feel free, after that, to comment on them?

> Α. Yes.

Now, how about Dr. Hastreiter?

We have received, I think, a page or two of Dr.

Hastreiter's conclusions in each case.

Yes.

Have you seen that?

Α. Yes.

Q. Do you feel competent, on the basis of that material, to deal with individual

cases about which Dr. Hastreiter has drawn a conclusion or do you want to hear what he says?

I would like to hear what he says, too, for the same reasons, I think.

MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Mr. Commis-

THE COMMISSIONER: Certainly.

MR. SCOTT: On the assumption that

Mr. Ortved, as I expect, covers everything, those are



K5

my questions.

I want to thank you, Dr. Rowe, for your patience and you, too, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr.

Scott.

MR. STRATHY: Just before Mr. Scott finishes, do I understand correctly that he does want to go back to the graph when it returns to us on Monday or Tuesday?

MR. SCOTT: Well, it may not be necessary. I don't want to ask any other questions about it. I tried to ask some questions this morning with the paper graph and I don't think there is any virtue in repeating those questions.

MR. STRATHY: I wonder, is there any chance we can get copies of the paper graph to take away with us this weekend?

MR. SCOTT: I will happily lend you mine if you are next in the cross-examination list, if that is all right, and we will certainly have the colour copies by Monday.

MR. STRATHY: That would be helpful.
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right.

Mr. Ortved, do you want to go now

or after lunch?



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				MR.	ORTVI	ED:	Ι	prefer	to	go	after
unch	if	it	will	suit	you,	Mr.	Co	ommissio	onei	î .	

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right.

We will rise until 2:30 and perhaps

at that time, if this missing list is -- some

missing document --

MR. SCOTT: Well, there are two documents that are to come from my examination. The first and the least important is a sample of what Dr. Rowe got from Atlanta. The second is, and he may have the weekend to work on this, his characterization of the 36 people in the light of the 14 potential causes for cardiac stoppage.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR. SCOTT: Are you with me, Dr.

Rowe?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I am afraid I am.

THE COMMISSIONER: Then until

2:30.

--- luncheon recess.



DM/ak

--- Upon resuming at 2:30 p.m.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr. Shinehoft, I understand you have some comments you wish to make.

MR. SHINEHOFT: Yes, Mr. Commissioner.

I was wondering if I could speak to the Commission about what is going to happen as far as, particularly after Mr. Ortved has concluded his so-called cross-examination by him of this witness, finally in the context, Mr. Commissioner, of what purpose counsel may have as far as interviewing witnesses and as far as preparing a witness.

Now normally my understanding in a trial in a civil or criminal matter once your own witness takes the box and once he is subject to cross-examination you as his counsel are not permitted to speak with him, or discuss the contents of the questions that are being raised.

My question to the Commission is will such restriction be imposed by the Commission as far as the Hospital's counsel and as far as the doctors' counsel is concerned after Mr. Ortved has finished his cross-examination.

THE COMMISSIONER: I could have my mind changed, but this matter was raised in Mississauga and I decided that it wasn't appropriate



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
to make any such orders in a Commission of this nature, and in fact I wasn't even sure I have the authority to make such an order. So I don't ordinarily unless something, or somebody has something to say and I don't see any reason, the witness doesn't have to speak to you if he doesn't want to, but if he wants to speak to you as long as you like, it is all right by me. I can't help somebody wanting to put something to me, that they had a great long discussion with you about this matter before or something like that. I am certainly not going to impose any obligation upon you. You have the right to speak to witnesses, your own witness, or anybody elses witness at any time, at any point in the crossexamination. I would rather you didn't do it right in the middle of his examination, that might be improper.

MR. SHINEHOFT: It would appear then that this is somewhat different than the normal court.

THE COMMISSIONER: This is as about as far away from the ordinary trial as one can get.

MR. SHINEHOFT: I am sure,

Mr. Commissioner, and I mean no disrespect whatsoever to both counsel who are involved and in whom I have




the utmost respect for but potentially it could lead to some terrible problems as I perceive it.

THE COMMISSIONER: There's no restriction on anyone's conversations with any witness at any time. Now, I don't know, as I say, my mind can be changed on that, if anybody feels strongly on it, the other way.

MR. SHINEHOFT: I just raise this concern on it, Mr. Commissioner. There was concern, and I just wanted to lay the foundation because I can envisage certain potential problems.

THE COMMISSIONER: One of the problems we have is the fact any witness who takes the stand seems to be there for some considerable time and it would be impossible to police it to begin with. But I don't think it is the same, it is not quite the same, because this is not really an adversary process, this is an investigation, an attempt to reach - in theory I can go out and get information from a man on the street without even telling you that I have got it. It is not what I consider a fair way to conduct an investigation but there is nothing to prevent me going out and asking what he thinks is the answer to this thing, a layman's interpretation of it.



MR. SHINEHOFT: I appreciate that,
Mr. Commissioner. I guess it is from my training
and experience as an advocate, the normal function in
a normal procedure that is followed in cross-examination
of a witness, and that is why I raise this matter.
Again I mean no disrespect to Mr. Scott or Mr. Ortved,
I feel it is a matter the Commission should address
itself to.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I think that it goes to the credibility of the witness and I invite you to raise it at any time if you want to.

MR. SHINEHOFT: Thank you very much.

THE COMMISSIONER: Unless somebody persuades me otherwise.

Now, the next thing is about Monday.

Mr. Strathy, I think it is you, you have a problem,

are you not able to proceed on Monday?

MR. STRATHY: I am sorry to be
the first one to say this, but there are others who
will say the same thing, but it does create difficulties for me, not absolutely insurmountable
difficulties. I was simply going to suggest from
my point of view I would be agreeable to starting at
9:00 sitting until noon and reducing the lunch hour
to an hour, but as I say I gather that there are



others who share my difficulty with Monday afternoon in any event.

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't know what anybody else feels about 9 o'clock in the morning.

MR. SCOTT: I would like to object to it, it is like being in prison, the only way to survive in prison is by establishing certain rules, civilized rules that permit you to carry on. I would much rather sit a fourth day than to sit, sir, from 9:00 to 6:00 with a sandwich for lunch. We all have other work to do and it seems to me we are all engaged in cross-examination, and an hour at the beginning and end of the day is very important for us.

it is really sort of beyond me, and if the hours are extended, and the last couple of hours I won't be able to take things in as well as I would like. We will leave it at that and when we go on to four days and perhaps eventually five days, but if it is going to be difficult next week for you.

MR. STRATHY: It is my understanding that others have the same strong feeling.

THE COMMISSIONER: How many others find it difficult?



MR. OLAH: Mr. Commissioner, I have some problem understanding, my understanding was this proceeding would be going to Labour Day and I have a trial on Monday and I would be most grateful.


thought. I know Mr. Percival has also indicated he has some problem. So I think we will forget about it for Monday, but I want to warn you now, it is near Labour Day, and when we return after Labour Day; on the 12th of September, we will be sitting on Monday the 12th of September and I think apparently thereafter, so if you can plot accordingly. The Friday, the boom has not yet been lowered on Friday, but you can expect at this time it will come as we get mired deeper and deeper. Well, all right. Then at the end of today's proceedings we will rise at 4:30, I don't know where we will be at at that time, but we will recess at 4:30 this afternoon until 10 o'clock next Tuesday. Yes, all right.

Now Mr. Scott, did you want another moment?

MR. SCOTT: No, I asked Dr. Rowe to bring that document next week.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

MR. SCOTT: And it may be put in



evidence at that time.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

Mr. Ortved.

MR. ORTVED: Thank you,

Mr. Commissioner. I can indicate I am sure to your pleasure, Mr. Commissioner, as well as everyone elses here that by virtue of Mr. Scott's very comprehensive examination I will be very much shorter.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

EXAMINATION BY MR. ORTVED:

Q. Dr. Rowe, you will recall that in the course of Mr. Lamek's questioning of you, you were directed on a great number of occasions to the fact that a number of the babies with which we are here concerned died of symptoms of bradycardia, irregularity, and on occasion ventricular fibrillation, do you recall that?

A. Yes.



B/EMT/ak

	Q.	And I	think	I am	not do	ing
any violence to	Mr. Lame	ek wher	n I sug	gest	to you	that
those questions	were pla	aced in	a cor	text	which	would
suggest that the	ose may b	oe symp	otomati	c of	digoxi	n
intoxication.						

A. Yes.

Q. Now, Mr. Scott in his cross-examination commenced I think you will recall with a number of alternative causes of death other than simple digoxin intoxication or congenital heart disease. Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

O. And in responding to him you indicated again that on a great number of occasions that bradycardia, irregularity and sometimes ventricular fibrillation may be characteristics of those modes of dying.

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Is that fair? And would that pertain to children in particular?

A. Yes, especially children.

 Ω . On what do you base your views in that regard?

A. Well, that is the common experience of observations that we have made of



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patients	dying	with	congenital	heart	disease
particularly	, when	re our	experience	rests	S .

Q. When you say "our", you're referring to you and your fellow cardiologists?

A. Yes, or pediatric cardiologists generally I think have had that impression.

Q. And in addition to your impression about which you have just told us, is there literature in this regard?

A. Yes. There is interestingly enough only one paper on the subject and it is quite recent.

Q. And is that paper entitled "Terminal Cardiac Electrical Activity in Pediatric Patients"?

A. Yes, that is the paper.

Q. By a number of authors to be found - actually I don't have the citations but I have a copy of the article. Do you have a copy where it is from?

A. Yes, it is from the American Journal of Cardiology, Volume 51, pages 557 to 561, and 1983, February.

MR. ORTVED: Now, Mr. Commissioner, I'm going to ask that a copy of this article be made



the next exhibit and I have copies of it for the various counsel.

THE COMMISSIONER:

Exhibit 134.

---EXHIBIT NO. 134:

Copy of paper entitled "Terminal Cardiac Electrical Activity in Pediatric Patients".

MR. ORTVED: Q. Do you have a copy,
Doctor? I had 20 copies of that, are there any extras
in the room? I see I have given away my own copy.

Now just dealing with that article if I could read the abstract, Dr. Rowe, and you know it well and you can assist me as to whether that accurately summarizes the article. It reads:

"Ventricular fibrillation is a frequently reported terminal cardiac electrical activity in adults. Such data are unavailable for pediatric patients.

Terminal cardiac electrical activity determined in 100 pediatric patients was bradycardic arrest throughout the death process in 88% of newborns, 67% of infants, and 64% of children.

Although bradycardic arrest was more common, the incidence of ventricular tachyarrthymias was higher in patients



ANGUS, STONEHOUSE & CO. LTD

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"who had congenital heart disease,
who had received cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, who were beyond the
neonatal period, and/or who weighed
2.23 kilograms. No definite
associations could be established
between arterial blood gases, electrolyte values, and type of terminal
cardiac electrical activity. The
development of ventricular fibrillation
may be related to cardiac mass and
the developing autonomic nervous
system and therefore is less likely
to occur in patients with a small
heart."

So firstly is that an accurate abstract of what the article says?

- A. Yes, it is.
- Q. And is that is the information contained in that abstract in accord with what you just told us is your experience?
 - A. Yes, it is.
- Q. And in particular you have told us that of the patients in the sample a number suffered from congenital heart disease; is that correct?



A. In the paper?

Q. That is right.

A. Yes.

Q. And you have indicated that in that paper the numbers are one-third of the newborns suffered from congenital heart disease, one half of the infants and fully 70% of the children in the samples; is that right?

A. That is it.

O. Now because I think it may be instructive and because the information about which you have told us up to this point in time is really just to be found in descriptions and charts, I understand that on page 2 of this article there are illustrations of strips which would indicate firstly at the top right hand corner of page 2 a bradycardic arrest. Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. And can you just assist the Commissioner and counsel here as to what is illustrated in those four strips?

A. Yes. They are labelled as you can see A, B, C, D. This is on the top of page 558 on the right hand side, Figure 1, and this is a five year old child who died from smoke inhalation.



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The top strip is one showing tachycardia but with a sinus rhythm. It is a fast rate of somewhere around about 160 or more per minute. It says I think 200 it says there. Yes, I suppose that is fair enough, 200 a minute.

And then the next section, Section B shows the heart rate very much slower. That is about 60 beats a minute.

Q. That would be referred to as bradycardia?

A. That would be bradycardia, and there is --

THE COMMISSIONER: What is the beat?
THE WITNESS: The beat is --

THE COMMISSIONER: I understand what it is of the heart, but what is it on the --

THE WITNESS: On the electrocardiogram? The very tall thin blip is the ventricular activations so that - the electrical signal for the ventricle - so that would be the equivalent of the ventricular activity.

In the second tracing you can see that blip again. It is very tall and thin. The wider peak is the T wave, the terminal part of the ventricular activity, and the very short blip just



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in front of the spike of the ventricular complex that you see on the left hand side of each complex is the atrial activity.

So in the top one there is atrial activity, ventricular activity of a normal type except that it is a fast rate.

In the second one it shows a much slower rate, at 60 a minute, with no other major change.

And then C is a complete heart block. That is there is a dissociation between the sinus node and the bottom chamber. It is just as though you had sectioned the bundle of His and you have just got the top chamber. You can barely see it beating, and it is beating out of phase with the Q.R.S. blip, the ventricular blip, and the ventricular blip is very slow. It is extremely slow. That works out at about 20, 30 beats a minute.

Q. Do we see in that strip C what has been referred to here as block?

A. Yes, that is heart block.

The blips from the ventricular are the ventricular rate operating on its own at a slow natural rhythm that is quite separate from any atrial activity.

Q. All right.



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A. And D is a very slow terminal
complex again in the presence of block, but with a
very wide ventricular component. You see it is
extremely wide, and that indicates a block even
further out in the system at the point where the
conduction system communicates directly with the
nuscle.

So this is a rapid rate at the start, tachycardia, which begins to slow and then develops heart block, and it is during that phase, although they don't show it on this record, with a very slow rate that you may get ectopic rhythm as well, but that is what they describe as a typical bradycardic arrest.

Q. All right. And how does that correspond to what your experience is a typical bradycardic arrest?

A. I think that is very characteristic of it.

Q. And then also and perhaps briefly the series of strips on the bottom right hand corner I understand that demonstrates ventricular fibrillation about which we have heard so much?

A. Yes. Now this is not a record in which they have captured the regular rate



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and then gone to fibrillation. This is a record in which they have done - in a child with congenital heart disease they have entered - they have taken the strips at the phase where there is ventricular fibrillation present after they have started resuscitation.

So A there shows this highly irregular different form, wave form, blips which are characteristic of ventricular fibrillation and they say that the rhythm deteriorates towards ventricular fibrillation towards the end of the strip. This is D. They say after resuscitation you have got ventricular complexes. Those are those blips in D and then it deteriorates again into ventricular fibrillation.

And even when they defibrillate, when they defibrillate with electrical conversion down in C the ventricular fibrillation pattern stops, but there is no beat resumed. So that the heart has completely arrested at that point.

Q. And defibrillation just because I don't know whether that has been explained, that is basically shocking, hopefully shocking the heart back into sinus rhythm.

A. Yes, it is an attempt to get rid of a very rapid rhythm whether it is regular or



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irregular in order to restore normal sinus activity.

THE COMMISSIONER: Just speaking

for myself I would find it easier to understand if

we had a normal heart beat somewhere. I don't know whether that is available.

MR. ORTVED: We will have to get the advertisement from the Heart Foundation that appears on the TTC.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, if we had it to compare.

MR. ORTVED: We can provide that.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think I could

better understand.

THE WITNESS: I will put that on my weekend's list.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, it is the first I have done this. It would help because...

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. ORTVED: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

Q. Then - I don't want to

interrupt you in the course of making your notes there.

Turning to page 3 of the article, actually page 559 of the Journal, there is, as I understand it in Figure 5 the bottom left hand corner, a breakout of the patients suffering from cardiac



defects. Is that correct?

A. Yes. Congenital heart

disease.

Q. And in particular the left hand bar graph, as I understand it, breaks down those patients in terms of terminal activity experienced by them?

A. Yes. It shows two groups of patients who have congenital heart disease and those with other diagnoses, and the one on the right, that is the one they refer to as non-cardiac.



Rowe ex. (Ortved)

18aug83 CC BMcra Q. Right. Dealing with the bar representing the cardiac patients, there are three separate delineations. One is bradycardic arrest, one is tachyarrhythmia to bradycardic arrest and the last is ventricular fibrillation; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Just dealing with that separate category of tachyarrhythmia to bradycardic arrest, are you able to assist us as to how that is to be distinguished from bradycardic arrest?

A. Just by the fact that some of those patients may start with tachycardia.

Q. Right.

A. Like that patient featured in Figure 1, I think.

Q. That you describe as a typical bradycardic arrest?

A. Yes.

Q. So, in fact, if we were to look at that graph in terms of a bradycardic arrest as opposed to ventricular fibrillation, would it in fact read 87 per cent suffer bradycardic arrest and 13 per cent ventricular fibrillation?

A. I think that would be a reasonable way. You could divide it up in a number of



CC₂

ways, but I think that is probably fair.

Q. Now, at our request - and we have seen it in certain of the exhibits that have been tendered already - did you go through the 36 patients with which we are here concerned and break them out in terms of whether the arrest described in the Hospital record was bradycardic or in the nature of ventricular fibrillation?

A. Yes, I did that. We can't do it exactly the same way. This was a study specifically designed to collect all, or to capture all, the electrical events from anybody who arrested. In most hospital circumstances, that would not be done because they don't keep a recorder running and recording on paper or tape for the entire procedure; they watch on the monitor and they record strips from time to time. But the record would, in our case, be very incomplete by comparison to this type of examination.

So that with that reservation, and dealing with descriptions from what is available in the chart - the record, I'm sorry, what is available in the record, the medical record, then this was the assessment I made.

Q. And did you at our request collate those and total them for us?

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hadly w/o vent (182

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A. I did.

MR. ORTVED: All right.

I am going to ask that that be the next exhibit, Mr. Chairman.

THE COMMISSIONER: Exhibit 135.

--- EXHIBIT NO. 135: Collated totals, 36 patients.

MR. ORTVED: Ω . Can you just


assist us as to those respective 36 patients totalled?

A. Well, there was one patient on whom we don't have sufficient information to make a decision. There are 27 with the bradycardia alone as far as I can judge and there were eight in whom there was ventricular fibrillation at some part of the record, usually preceded by bradycardia but in two instances it was the initiating event.

Q. And having regard to the reservation that you have already given us, how does that compare to what might be expected having regard to the article found in the American Journal of Cardiology?

A. I think it would be along the same lines. I think there are some differences but not big ones.

Q. So, in terms of whether or not there is any significance to the terminal events with



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which you went through with Mr. Lamek, is there any --

A. No.

Q. Is there anything about the terminal events that you went through with Mr. Lamek that would tend to incline you towards digoxin intoxication as opposed to any of the other causes, among them being those you went through with Mr. Scott, or just the anatomical defect?

A. No.

Q. Now, what I would like to do, Dr. Rowe, is go to the meetings that you have been through in some detail - I won't spend a long time on them I hope but to review them again and perhaps from a little different perspective.

I am dealing with the meetings you held with the other members of the staff in the Hospital on September 5th and September 26th of 1980 and on January 12, 1981.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, dealing with the first meeting, September 5, 1980, I think you told us earlier that that meeting was called at your instance with a view to allaying the concerns on the part of nurses about the number of patients who were dying; is that fair?



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Α. Yes.

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0. You have already told us more than once that those deaths had been reviewed individually; correct?

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Α.

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And was there anything in those death individually that raised any alarm as far as the staff were concerned?

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0. Aside from perhaps Velasquez and Woodcock, about whom you have told us were referred to the Coroner; right?

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> Α. That's right.

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Q. And in particular, in terms of the nursing care afforded those patients - and we are dealing now with the patients that died in July and August - what was your view as to the quality of

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that care?

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The quality of that care was Α.

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excellent.

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0. Did that enter into your decision to meet with the nurses to allay this apparent concern they had?

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Yes. Α.

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And what was the purpose of Q.

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the meeting? How were you going to allay their concerns?

A. Well, we wanted to discuss the cases that had died, or some of the cases anyway, in July and August and we selected examples of babies where we could clarify with the nurses the way in which these babies had behaved and why they died.

Q. And in terms of your view as to why they had died, what was that?

A. We felt they had died from the severity of their disease process.

Q. Right.

Now, there are two meetings,
September 5th and September 26th. We know there were
six infants discussed. Are you able to recall
whether the six were chosen with a view to presenting
them at the first meeting or there were three chosen
and then a second meeting was convened and three more
chosen? Are you able to recall?

A. I can't remember. I think it is unlikely -- we got through the list we made for the first conference because there were only three but I cannot remember whether we made the list complete at the beginning or later.

Q. All right.

Then you have told us already that



you chaired the meeting.

A. Yes.

Q. And we know from Exhibit 46, which are the nurses' notes apparently made at that meeting of September 5, 1980, that it would appear that you introduced the first meeting talking about the experience in the Cardiology Division with the approximately 100 deaths a year.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall doing that?

A. Well, when it was put to me earlier from my own minutes, I couldn't recall that but, when I saw the notes that I think Nurse Radojewski has made, I was persuaded that is what I did, and that would make sense to me.

Q. In terms of that number, where would you have gotten that number?

A. Well, as I think I have said before, we look at the deaths on a sort of annual basis, or cardiac deaths in the Hospital.

Q. All right.

You don't have the graph that is out being reproduced, but you have made it clear that that is not deaths just on the ward but all cardiac deaths on all wards.

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A. Yes, it would be all cardiac deaths within the Hospital.

Q. And just dealing with those deaths, we can see from the graph that does remain here - I forget the exhibit number - Exhibit 128 - that those deaths can fluctuate substantially month-by-month.

A. Yes.

Q. Just looking from my own vantage point here at, for instance, February 1977, I see we are at about seven, and March of 1977, it is six; whereas, in April 1977, you go up to, I would say, thirteen. Is that fair?

A. Yes.

Q. So, you can get these very large fluctuations in number, is that correct?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. And dealing with the deaths that you are reviewing at the September meetings with the nurses, we know what those numbers were for July and August. Were those higher than was the usual experience in the division of cardiology, the ward?

A. On the ward, yes.

Q. And was that a matter of concern for the staff, the medical staff?



that the concern was allayed.


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	Α.	Well,	death	is	always	a
matter of concern	for the	staff	, but	the	babies	that
we were discussing	here w	vere of	a deg	ree	of sev	erity

Q. All right. And what was the perception of those numbers experienced on the ward being out of the ordinary, as they were, having regard to the experience that you all have as cardio=logists?

- A. Not remarkable.
- Q. Now, the meetings, I think you have told us and I don't think anyone will object to my leading, were, from your point of view, summarized in Exhibits 45 and 51, your minutes of the two respective meetings; is that fair?
 - A. That's right.
- Q. And dealing with Exhibit 45, do you have a copy of your minutes of the September 5th meeting?
 - A. Yes, I do.
- Q. In the last paragraph of those minutes it is indicated nevertheless, it was pointed out that in all the cases described here the anatomy was extremely severely disturbed, the risk of any intervention was very high and that this is influencing



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the course of events in the type of patients we are now seeing.

Do you see that portion?

- A. Yes, I do.
- Q. Was that discussed at that

meeting?

A. Well, we had had discussions, I can't remember all the details of what was said, but there were comments that we made after each case and I believe that the severity of the malformations was nearly accounting for most of our explanation.

Nevertheless, there were a couple of patients where we questioned whether the babies, despite the very severe prognosis, might have been better handled in an intermediate Intensive Care setting.


Q. Right. I am going to come to that, but just dealing with the general characterization of "extremely severely disturbed anatomy", was there any contest that you recall to that interpretation on the part of those making the presentation?

A. No, no, I don't believe so and particularly here the question was that from the nursing point of view their concerns I believe were that they were fighting to save the babies and they felt frustrated that they weren't able to bring them



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through, and I think this type of conference for them was helpful because it indicated in a way to them the thinking that we had about the malformations and what was revealed by the investigations and what, in retrospect, we thought about the outcome and so on.



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So I think the purpose of that meeting, insofar as the nurses were concerned, was probably satisfied, but we did discuss a lot of things in connection with these infants, including ways in which we might handle things and management questions; different things.

Q. Now, you have told us the purpose with which you went into those meetings and, having regard to the nature of the discussions at those two meetings, did you come away from them with a view, an altered view as to the usefulness for the staff as opposed to just explaining things to the nurses who might have some outstanding questions?

- A. Yes, I think we did.
- Q. And what was that?
- A. We felt that the exchange of information that occurs under those circumstances was beneficial. We don't always have the input from nurses in death conferences. There may be a few people there but not as many as we were able to have at those two conferences. So that, I certainly had the feeling that this was a fruitful way of exchanging information about the concerns and problems and management.
- Q. The item you mentioned a few moments ago concerning the concept of an inter-



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mediate ICU, was that one of the fruitful items that came out of the exchange?

- A. Yes, I think so.
- Q. Now, just dealing with this intermediate ICU for the moment, what was it envisaged such a unit might be able to provide?

A. Well, we had the feeling that it might be expected that, with that type of unit, it would be possible to do more detailed monitoring of patients' conditions through additional equipment and so on and, of course, as well, it would provide a larger density of nursing supervision.

Q. Now, in the next-to-last paragraph, the penultimate paragraph of Exhibit 51, your minutes of the meeting of September 26, one of the items listed under "Conclusions" is that this concept of an intermediate ICU is one that ought to be explored; is that right?

A. Yes. I don't think, at that stage, we had come to an absolute conclusion about this. We had our feelings about it and thought it would be worthwhile getting together with nursing and trying to work out the pros and cons of such a unit.

O. And what was your impression,



to the extent you are able to recall it, going back to September 26th, as to the reaction on the part of nursing to such a concept at that point in time?

A. I think it was positive at that time.

Q. Now, because of a number of questions put by Mr. Lamek in the course of his examination-in-chief concerning monitoring and what might be accomplished in a unit described as an intermediate ICU, we have heard from your evidence and from the record that, for instance, monitoring is available on the ward prior to the introduction of any intermediate ICU; is that right?

A. Yes.

 Ω . And when you see the word "monitoring", what is usually being referred to?

A. It is usually an electrocardiagraphic monitoring.

Q. In fact, Mr. Lamek has indicated that if closer supervision is what is sought, it is open to the doctors to order constant care nursing; is that so?

A. Yes, that is so.

Q. Now, did the intermediate

ICU that was contemplated as of the fall of 1980, was



it designed to accomplish anything more than electrocardiographic monitoring and closer supervision?

A. Well, it would -- detail of monitoring would be expanded. That is, I think in our thinking at that time we wanted to extend the monitoring from just the electrocardiograph and we wanted to --

Q. Can you give us some examples of what we are talking about, because it seems to have created some confusion up to this point in time?

A. Well, there are additional things that one can monitor. The rate of breathing as well as the heart rate, the blood pressure and the venous pressure by various invasive lines. That is, measurements of pressure that are obtained from blood vessels.

Q. I see.

A. That was one. The possibility of measurement of oxygen tensions and carbon dioxide tensions on a more frequent basis through arterial lines is real and possibly through what is called transcutaneous measurement of oxygen tension.

We hadn't formulated precisely what things would go into that unit at that stage, if we did



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get such a unit, if it was approved or if it was agreed to, but that point hadn't been reached.

Those were the sort of things we were thinking about, a considerable extension of what is possible on the ordinary ward.

Q. And apnea monitor is a description of a monitor that I have heard. Was that another type of monitor that might be considered?

A. Yes.

Q. And dealing with all those items of equipment, or forms of monitoring that you have enumerated, were those generally available on the ward as of the fall of 1980?

A. No.

Q. Then I guess, insofar as supervision was concerned, was it envisaged that such a unit might involve additional nursing staff?

A. You would have to involve nursing staff especially trained in that particular additional area, particularly if arterial lines and that sort of thing were involved.

Q. I see.

A. So, really, it requires a



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a period of -- it requires people who have had Intensive Care Unit training or some tuition by that group of individuals.

Q. Then, also, going to Exhibit No. 51, your minute of that September 26th meeting, you indicated in the final paragraph that the reviews would continue and Dr. Jedeikin would organize the ensuing meeting; correct?

- A. That is correct.
- Q. And we have heard in your evidence that you went out of the country and that was not done.
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. However, as I understand it, the idea didn't die on the vine because, if I could direct you to your letter which is part of Exhibit No. 64, your response to Dr. Trusler, dated December 29, 1980 do you have a copy of that letter?
- A. I have the Trusler letter but, somehow, I don't have my own.
- Q. You indicated in that letter, in the fourth paragraph, the following passage:

"The other question was in relation to the perceived need of an intermediate Intensive Care Unit on



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4A/B. It is my feeling that such a unit should be seriously considered, particularly since most of the patients we are talking about are small infants at relatively high risk from respiratory arrests and probably who need a much higher nurse/patient ratio than is currently provided at nights on that ward. Whether this should be officially tied in with the ICU proper and have staff attachment from that ward is a matter for further discussion. think that the provision of such a small unit might offer a solution to some of these problems and that its formation should be seriously considered at this stage." Do you recall that passage?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. So, going to your return in December and your review in December and, in particular, your response to Dr. Trusler, was this an idea that, insofar as you are concerned, was gaining ground?

A. Yes.

The It wide! Deaths occurred at nighti bream not enough much at night; need more nurses at night breams that's when the deaths were occurring!

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		Q.	I am	interes	sted in	your	
reference	in that	paragra	aph ir	that l	letter,	the	
reference	to the	nurse/pa	atient	ratio,	"a hig	gher	
nurse/pat:	ient rat	io than	is cu	irrently	provid	led at	
nights on	the war	d". Tl	he ref	erence	to "nig	ghts",	why
"nights"?							

A. Because of the fact that there had been many of the deaths at night.

Q. Now, I am not going to review at any length your preparation for the review done in December but just dealing with the next meeting, the January 12, 1981 meeting.

Firstly, can you advise the Commissioner as to the frequency with which such a meeting might take place?

- A. That would be an extraordinary meeting.
- Q. In terms of your experience as a cardiologist, how often would such a meeting have been convened?
- A. That sort of meeting, well, that sort of meeting might have been held -- we might have held a similar meeting when we were planning the ward, the reconstruction of the ward or something like that, but it would be very unusual for us to meet in a

Presumasty the unusual subjurns hard because the rituation (death ratio) was unusual!

small group with senior staff to talk about something of this sort.

Q. And in terms of the persons asked to be present or who did attend that meeting, included among which were the Director of Nursing, the Nursing Coordinator, Dr. Edmunds and the cardio-vascular surgeons. Again, can you assist us as to the frequency with which that sort of a group, that sort of expertise, might be brought together?

A. On a non-regular basis, you mean, unless there was a hospital committee for some other reason. This was not a hospital committee as such; it was an ad hoc meeting. It would be very uncommon.

Q. In terms of the review that was conducted in preparation for that meeting - and I have already said I don't intend to go through it - can you just assist us as to was this an overnight affair? What sort of effort went into it?

amount of effort went into that review and it took a long time to get it all together, for the reasons I have said before. It is much easier to conduct a review a year later and get in all the records and everything together than it is to try and complete a

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review as you are finishing the six-month per	iod
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Q. Now, I just want to ensure that we are all on the same wavelength and dealing with Exhibit No. 65. That Exhibit No. 65 consists of the minutes of the meeting, which you compiled, I guess, obviously after the meeting of January 12, 1981?

A. Yes.

Q. And then goes on to contain a page entitled "Sequence of Deaths of 4A/B Management Codes" and a "Summary".

Now, do I understand correctly that, in anticipation of this meeting, there was a handout that went out to the various people asked to attend?

- A. Yes.
- Q. And who prepared that?
- A. I prepared that after working it out with the people involved in helping me do it.



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Q. My understanding is that that handout contained the last three pages of Exhibit
No. 65 plus an agenda of another page; is that correct?

A. Yes. The other page concerned a statement about the numbers of patients who had died in the Operating Room or in the Intensive Care Unit after operation.

MR. ORTVED: All right. I just think that as a matter of housekeeping I should ensure that that is properly reflected in the record, Mr. Commissioner.

I see with my faulty organization, I haven't copied the agenda which I will undertake to do, but I do have copies of the additional page that was part of the handout. Perhaps that should be made part of Exhibit No. --

THE COMMISSIONER: 65? Make it 65A.

--- EXHIBIT NO. 65A: One page document entitled: Deaths on Cardiological Ward, July-December 1980.

THE WITNESS: May I interject just one thing; for reasons that are not entirely obvious but because probably we had difficulty in obtaining all the Operating Room and Intensive Care information as easily as the stuff on the ward, that page is not terribly accurate. I have had to revise it extensively





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in terms of the ages of the patients and in terms of the total number of patients.

MR. ORTVED: Q. All right. But the page that we have just tendered is part of the handout that went out to the people who attended the meeting?

A. That is right.

Q. And the agenda which my colleagues here may or may not have, it is very short. It is entitled "Discussion of Cardio-surgical Mortality with Special Reference to Deaths on 4A/B, Luncheon Conference, Monday, January 12, 1980." Agenda, background of the problem, again the date, secondly the review of six-month experience, July-December 1980; thirdly, suggestions for medical nursing staff and fourthly, recommendations. Right?

A. Yes.

Q. Now stopping there and dealing firstly with the luncheon conference --

THE COMMISSIONER: Before we go any further the "see over" at the bottom of that, is that what appears to be page 58?

MR. ORTVED: What I have just filed which is 56A --

THE COMMISSIONER: 65A.

MR. ORTVED: 65A.





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THE COMMISSIONER: Should that come in just before page 57 and 58?

MR. ORTVED: Exactly. It comes before what you have as page 58 in Exhibit 65.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. It comes in between.

MR. ORTVED: It is the page before page 58.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right.

MR. ORTVED: And if we were to put the package together that was just distributed, the agenda to which I have made reference would be the page preceding 56 - 65A.

Now the fact that --

MR. SCOTT: Did Mr. Lamek have that?

MR. LAMEK: No, I did not.

MR. SCOTT: Oh, I see. It was over-

looked, was it?

MR. LAMEK: It was not provided to me.

MR. ORTVED: Q. The fact that the

conference took place at a luncheon conference, could you just explain that?

A. The reason for that is that is usually extremely difficult to get physicians and nurses at either the beginning or end of the day and



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the only reasonable expectation of getting a senior group together like that is over a method where they have to stop to eat, and we were able to accomplish that rather easily.

Q. Are you able to recall the actual duration of that conference?

A. Well, I don't know exactly how long it was, but it was longer than an hour or so. It was probably a couple of hours. Hour and a half or two hours.

Q. I am not going to go through that meeting in detail because Mr. Lamek has already done so with you, but briefly was there discussion about the death experience on Wards 4A/B?

A. Yes.

Q. And again was there any consensus as to the root cause of that unfortunate experience?

A. Well, everybody recognized the fact that they were infant patients and severely affected, and that was a matter that was addressed by the intensivists, the surgeons, ourselves and the nurses.

Q. And again I asked this before but was there any contest of that characterization of the root cause of the problem?



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	Α.	There	were	several	area	is th	at
were discussed	at gre	eat le	ength,	and it	was a	igree	d
that that was -	- that	the p	roblem	surrou	nded	the	best
way of managing	g the s	sick b	aby.				

Q. All right. And you have in your minutes filed here as Exhibit No. 65, detailed those suggestions that came out of that meeting? Correct?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. And those are in terms of more operating time and the like?

A. Yes.

Q. And in particular there was another recommendation which is contained in the final paragraph of that minute, namely in terms of exploring this concept of an intermediate ICU. Is that right?

A. Yes, that was preceded by the paragraph that there was a need to increase the number of resident staff.

Q. In terms of the intensivists' input, can you assist us as to what it was in terms of supporting or otherwise this suggestion?

A. Well, the intensivist from the Intensive Care Unit, the person involved was Dr. John Edmonds, the senior member of that group, and he pointed out that the Intensive Care Unit was very





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seriously stretched in terms of its capability of dealing with everything and there were certain reasons why there couldn't be much further expansion of the unit in its existing form.

He was I think in favour of the notion of some intermediate unit of the sort that had been proposed earlier, and he was not worried about whether it should be in existence but rather more where it should be in relation to the wards. Should it be next to the Intensive Care Unit or should it be next to the ward or in the ward, and that was his contribution there.


And dealing with the nursing 0. input to that discussion, are you able to recall the support or otherwise on the part of the nursing representatives present?

Yes. The Director of Nursing was very positive in her statement about that, and in fact I virtually used her words to describe their position at that time.

Is that what is found in the 0. next to the last paragraph?

Yes. That is the next to last paragraph before recommendations.

They felt rather strongly that the unit



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should be on the ward, and I think by the end of that meeting there was a general agreement about that.

Q. And the conclusion and recommendation was that a committee would be formed to explore that concept?

A. Yes.

Q. Dealing with this whole concept, was it the item that was going to turn this experience around?

A. Well, we didn't know that for sure, of course. We could only conclude from examination of the situation by a number of experienced people in the different fields involved that that was a reasonable approach to take to perhaps try to turn it around.

We recognized that many of these were very sick babies. Some of the babies might not be greatly improved by the provision of such a unit, but the best chance for all babies would be by putting such a thing in position.

Q. So was such a committee as was recommended in the last paragraph of that minute formed?

- A. Yes, it was.
- Q. And who was appointed to it?



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who	is son	t of	the a	dmin	istra	ative	war	d chie:	f, a	ind	he
and.	Mrs. F	Radoje	ewski	and 1	or. 1	Edmon	ds I	belie	ve w	ere	
the	people	and	maybe	Dr.	Will	liams	as 1	well -	-		

All right.

-- one of the surgeons, formed the basic committee that was going to explore what might be done.

0. Are you able to assist us as to when that committee was appointed?

A. I think the committee was appointed very shortly after that meeting. A few days I think.

> Are you aware as to whether it 0.

> > A. Yes, it did meet.

And have you seen and are you able to identify minutes taken, provided by that committee?

Yes, I have some. I am not sure I have them all.

I have here a minute you provided Q. to me of a meeting with Dr. Williams, Dr. Edmonds and Mrs. Radojewski for Tuesday, January 20, 1981, over the signature of Dr. Fowler.



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A. Yes.

Q. Do you have that?

A. Yes, I have that.

MR. ORTVED: I will ask that that be the next exhibit, please.

THE COMMISSIONER: That would be Exhibit 136, is it?

Can you help us, Mr. Ortved, how long you think you will be? I was just wondering about a break, that is all.

MR. ORTVED: I still anticipate concluding this afternoon.


THE COMMISSIONER: No, but I just wondered. I thought if you were finishing or expecting to finish in the next 15 or 20 minutes we would carry on.

MR. ORTVED: I can't promise that.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think we will take a break now for 15 minutes.

--- EXHIBIT NO. 136: Minute of Meeting with Dr. Williams, Dr. Edmonds and Mrs. Radojewski, January 20, 1981.

--- Short recess.



FF/BB/ak

---Upon resuming.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr. Ortved.

MR. ORTVED: Thank you,

Mr. Commissioner.

Q. Now, dealing with the last exhibit, Dr. Rowe, the minutes over the signature of Dr. Fowler. Have you seen those before?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. And where those provided to you at or about the date that is indicated in the title, January 29th, 1981?

A. Yes.

Q. And just very briefly on those minutes, the first paragraph is:

"It was decided at the previous meeting that the unit should be located
on Ward 4A at Room 418. It is rated
for 6 infant beds at this time, the
Intensive Care Unit is planned for
4 beds."

Now, it is my understanding that the first meeting of this Committee took place on January 14th. Are you able to assist me as to that?

A. I think there was a meeting prior to this one, yes, but I don't have the minutes



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of that.

Q. All right. And this Minute details the discussions that ensue concerning the personnel and equipment for this intermediate ICU, right?

A. Yes.

Q. Just dealing with the equipment, briefly, and I'm not going to read that paragraph, but does that mention as planned for the unit some of those items of equipment that you have already indicated might benefit such a unit and be more generally available on the floor?

A. Yes.

Q. And also in terms of personnel, it indicates that it would be necessary to have 10 nurses for administration and there should be a team leader as well. It doesn't go on to say whether or not that would be an addition to the complement on Wards 4A/B, but what was your understanding in that regard?

A. I think that was the total that they had planned and some of the existing nurses would be included in that total.

 Ω . Were the meetings of the Committee followed up with a formal proposal which



1 2 detailed their conclusion and recommendations? 3 Α. Yes. 4 Is that the document which 0. 5 I have distributed entitled "Intermediate Intensive Care Unit in Wards 4A/B"? 6 Α. It is. 7 Now, do you have a copy of 0. 8 that, Dr. Rowe? 9 I do. Α. 10 I have a copy for you, 0. 11 Mr. Commissioner, and I have distributed copies I 12 believe to everyone. THE COMMISSIONER: Exhibit 137. 13 14 Document entitled "Intermediate ---EXHIBIT NO. 137: Intensive Care Unit in Wards 15 4A/B". 16 MR. ORTVED: Thank you. 17 That document, going on to 0. 18 page 6, Dr. Rowe, is dated 12 March, 1981 over the signature of Dr. Fowler, correct? 19 Α. Yes. 20 0. Did you see it or receive it 21 at or about that time?

> Α. Yes.


Now, again, I am not going to 0. review that document in its entirety, it speaks for

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
itself, but perhaps just very briefly going to the equipment section at page 3 and following. It talks about ECG impression monitors, portable defibrillator, infusion pump. Again, are these things that would not be ordinarily available on the ward?

- A. That's right.
- Q. And again on page 5 under equipment the pressure transducer, again, something not ordinarily found on the ward?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Dealing with the section of that recommendation entitled Personnel, Dr. Fowler goes on to spell out in the second paragraph there on page 3 that the extra nurses for the unit would only increase the complement on Ward 4A by seven since there are nurses already assigned to work in this room as a regular patient room.
 - A. Yes.
- Q. However, what he is saying,

 I take it, is that if in fact the unit is introduced

 there will be an additional seven nurses for the floor,

 correct?
 - A. I think that's the number.
- Ω . Then just to conclude on this topic, was there in fact a presentation to the,



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what is it called, Program Advisory Committee?

A. Yes.

Q. And who made that?

A. I made that submission in conjunction with Dr. Trusler.

Q. And is that as was envisaged in the January 12th meeting as contained in the recommendation found in the minute of that meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. And are you able to recall when that presentation took place?

A. I think it was some time in March. I don't have the exact date.

Q. All right.

A. Maybe it was April; maybe it

was April.

Q. Of what year?

A. I will have to get that

date, I'm sorry, I don't have it.

Q. Of what year?

A. 1981.

Q. And was it based upon the

document which has been filed as Exhibit No. 137?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. And in fact was that unit



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approved?

A. There was further discussion of the unit. There were subsequent examinations by the nursing service of additional parts, and I submitted an addendum to the proposal which I think incorporated the need for additional sub-speciality residents on the floor.

Q. All right.

A. And that was submitted as an addendum on April 23rd, 1981.

Q. All right. Now, do you have that with you?

A. I have it with me.

Q. Might I see it, please?

All right. Well, I don't intend to make any reference to it other than to file it to complete the picture, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Well, was your proposal written, the one that you put in, you and Dr. Trusler put in?

THE WITNESS: We used the proposal which Dr. Fowler - and we simply presented the material to the Program Advisory Committee.

THE COMMISSIONER: So, it is Exhibit 137 that was presented?



THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, all right.

MR. ORTVED: Q. And then you have produced an addendum which is entitled "The Hospital for Sick Children Memorandum" from Richard D. Rowe to Mr. L.B. Murray dated April 23, 1981 and the subject is "Sub-Speciality Resident in Cardiology - Addendum to the --- "

A. "...to the Request for an Intermediate Intensive Care Unit".

Q. All right, "Addendum to the Request for Intermediate Intensive Care Unit".

THE WITNESS: Mr. Commissioner, I do not have another copy of that, so, we will have to Xerox it.

MR. ORTVED: Well, we will make a Xerox available to you as well as to the others.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, yes. Well, I think what we will do is, we will make it Exhibit 138 and copies of that will be available on Tuesday. You don't need it between now and Tuesday?

THE WITNESS: No, I don't need it.

MR. ORTVED: I'm not going to ask

you questions on it.

THE WITNESS: As long as I have a



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record, that's the only copy I have.

Memorandum re "Sub-Speciality ---EXHIBIT NO. 138: in Cardiology - Addendum to the Request for Intermediate Intensive Care Unit", dated April 23, 1981.

MR. ORTVED: Q. Was this unit eventually introduced on to the ward?

> Yes, it was. Α.

And I take it that there were 0. certain birth pains that were associated?

> Yes, there were. Α.

And in fact it was introduced I believe you have told me in November, 1982?

> Α. Yes.

Q. And that involved in part the process of approval and in the retraining of the nurses to staff it.

The hiring and the training Α. of nurses. It was particularly the hiring of nurses.

Q. Hiring due to just the unavailability of nursing personnel?

> Yes, during that period. Α.

And in fact has it resulted 0. in additional complement of nurses to the ward? Α.


Yes. Yes, it has.

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	Q.	And	lis	it	being	utili	zed	for
the purposes	envisioned	at	the	mee	etings	that	took	
place in 1980	0/1981?							

A. Yes, it is. I feel very strongly that the addition of the unit has been helpful. I can't show figures of what it may or may not have done in terms of survival of patients, but there is no question that the nurses feel a lot more comfortable with it, as do the physicians, and it is working, in my view, very well.

Q. I'm going to leave that topic and move on to another topic and that is the chronology of events following upon the Estrella serum digoxin levels being discovered.

Baby Janice Estrella, as we now well know, died January 11th, 1981, correct?


A. Yes.

Q. As I understand it, the serum digoxin level requested in that case is the first postmortem digoxin level to your knowledge in the Hospital?

- A. I think that is correct.
- Q. And when did you become aware

of the level reported of 72 in relation to Janice

Estrella?



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A. I believe that was in the early part of March, the second week of March.

Q. I just can't recall whether you did this earlier in your evidence, but how were you able to fix it as the second week in March of 1981?

A. I think it was when Dr. Fowler came to me about the result at that time. I cannot remember the precise date, but his recollection is also the second week.

MR. OLAH: I'm sorry, I didn't hear the name of the physician.

THE WITNESS: Dr. Fowler.

MR. ORTVED: Q. When you say

Dr. Fowler came to you, what did he have in hand, if anything, when he came to you to discuss this level?

A. He came with a copy that he had received in the mail of the autopsy report on this individual.

Q. All right. Now, I'm referring to the Estrella record and, in particular, page 12 of that record, the last paragraph of that report which provides as follows:

"Samples of postmortem blood were



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"obtained for assay of digoxin levels.

These samples were contaminated slightly by edema fluid and ascitic fluid. The digoxin levels on these samples measure 72 nanograms per millilitre (toxic range 2.0 to 9.0 nanograms per millilitre of blood).

This level is markedly elevated over the normal therapeutic range and if accurate would explain the death of the patient."

Now, did you ever review that

paragraph?

- A. Yes.
- Q. And was it that paragraph that was the subject matter of a discussion between yourself and Dr. Fowler in this second week of March, 1981?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Now, what was the conclusion, or what was the discussion firstly between yourself and Dr. Fowler concerning that particular paragraph?
- A. Well, the question was whether anybody, whether either of us had ever encountered a level of that nature before and what it meant and whether there was some possibility of error involved in a value of that magnitude.

What inquiry did either of Wen make?



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Q. Well dealing firstly with the initial part of that discussion, had you ever encountered such a level before, what was the

consensus in that regard? 5

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A. No, we have never, we neither of us have seen a level of that magnitude before, personally.

0. And then going to the second aspect, your reaction to it, what was it?

A. Well, we both wondered whether it might be some error of a decimal point initially, but the comment about the contamination was the other factor that concerned us.

Just on this point, what is firstly edema fluid?

Edema fluid is free fluid within the body between tissues, or in cavities.

And ascitic fluid?

A. That is edema fluid in the abdominal cavity.

And would those respective fluids, either one or both, or in combination, serve as a contaminant?

> Yes. A.

Now just on the topic of your

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conclusion that there might be contamination, I am going to read to you a portion of the evidence of Dr. Glen Taylor, given at the Preliminary Hearing before His Honour, Judge Vanek.

MR. OLAH: What volume?

MR. ORTVED: This is Volume No. 17,

page No. 111, for February 15th, 1982.

Q. I am going to read to you portions of this and then ask you about your views on certain of these passages. Firstly, page 111, line No. 12:

"Q. Did you take any kind ... " this is on examination-in-chief by Mr. McGee, Dr. Rowe.

THE COMMISSIONER: Can you help us, what volume is it?

MR. ORTVED: Volume 17.

THE COMMISSIONER: This is the

Preliminary Inquiry. You are in luck, you can read anything you like because nobody can check up on you.

MR. ORTVED: I think Mr. Lamek might --

THE COMMISSIONER: Have you got it?

MR. LAMEK: I will check later.

MR. ORTVED: I promise to read it

accurately.





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at line 12:

** Q.	Dio	d yo	ou	take	e any	kir	nd	of	a	bloo	d
samp	le,	or	bl	.ood	samp]	Les	fr	om	Ва	aby	
Estr	ella	a?									

"A. Yes, I did.

"Q. And where did you take these blood samples from, what part of the baby's body?

"A. There were two samples. One sample was obtained from blood milked from leg veins.

"THE COURT: Q. Where?

"A. The leg veins and the second sample was obtained from blood and fluid in the pelvic cavity of the body."


Just stopping there. The business of milking leg veins, maybe you should just describe for us what is being spoken of there?

A. Well, I am not sure, because I wasn't there while he was collecting it of course.

But milking the leg veins would be that he would presumably be massaging the leg in some way to extract what blood, or fluid was left in the system.

Q. Again onto page 112, commencing

"Q All right, I am showing you - well, first of all, the procedure in taking



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"samples, when you take them what do you do with them?

"A. Under normal circumstances they are taken in the autopsy suite and I obtain the specimens, usually label the tubes appropriately and give the tubes to the autopsy assistant who then fills out a requisition and delivers the specimen with requisition to the chemistry laboratory.

"Q. All right. Do you know who the autopsy assistant was on the Estrella baby's case?

"A. Yes.

"O. Who was that?

"A. It was Mrs. Djokic, D-j-o-k-i-c.

"Q. Mrs. Djokic. All right. Was that the procedure you followed in that case?

"A. Not in this case, no.

"O. Not in that case?

"A. Not in that case.

"Q. What happened in that case, the Estrella case?

"A. I forgot to obtain the specimens





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"durkng the usual course of the autopsy and I had to go back to the morque, which is in the basement below the autopsy suite and open the body and obtain the specimens.

"O. All right. How were you able to identify the body when you went back to the morque to do that?

"A. Identify the body by ID bracelet and by facial features.

"Q. All right. Was it the same body that you had performed the autopsy on earlier?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How much earlier had you done the autopsy?

"A. I think it was about 30 minutes between finishing the autopsy and remembering I forgot to take the specimens."

Then going down to page, the bottom of

page 113:

"O. All right, so you obtained one sample from the leg and one from the cavity below the stomach?





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"A. Yes.

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"Q. Would either of those exhibits be contaminated in any way to your knowledge?

"A. Yes. The pelvic sample was most likely contaminated with edema fluid from the tissues and from ascites fluid in the cavity itself.

"O. All right, and when you say contaminated, I use the phrase contaminated, would that mean diluted or what?

"A. The blood would be diluted by these fluids, yes.

"O. Diluted by the fluids?

"A. Yes."

Now he goes on and at page 119 there is this exchange:

> I see. All right. Well, did you formulate an opinion as to the cause of death of Janice Estrella?

"A. My initial opinion was that she died as a result of congenital heart failure and pneumonia. Subsequently with a discussion with Dr. Manser

Did they ask in it? Fowler say 1 not!

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
"concerning the digoxin level it was decided that if that was an accurate level that the digoxin level was sufficient to account for her death."

And I won't read further, but I can

indicate to the Commission that it would appear from this transcript that the sample taken from the pelvic cavity, the gutter blood, was the sample that generated the value of 72 and it was the sample milked from the leg vein that gave a subsequent analysis of greater than 4.7. Now the record will confirm the matter in that regard, I believe, Mr. Commissioner.

Having regard to that background, you have indicated to the Commissioner that your reaction upon reading that report of Dr. Manser's was that there was most likely an error in the sample as a result of contamination, is that fair?

- A. Yes, I think so.
- Q. Pardon me?
- A. We wanted to have further confirmation than was available at that particular moment.
- Q. All right. But as of that point in time was that your impression?
- A. That was a strong feeling we had then, yes.



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0. And I know we are now dealing with after acquired knowledge, but having regard to that knowledge, in fact having regard to the description given by Dr. Taylor as to the mode of obtaining those two respective samples, what is your view now as to whether or not those would have been contaminated?

MR. LAMEK: I am sorry, those would have been contaminated?

MR. ORTVED: Yes.

MR. LAMEK: I thought the evidence you read referred to the contamination of one sample, and that is the only one that Dr. Rowe was aware of in chief anyway.


MR. ORTVED: All right, let me deal then firstly ---

MR. LAMEK: I showed you the second one and until then you had not been aware of it.

MR. SCOTT: Counsel shouldn't directly deal with the witness in that fashion, you should make submissions to the Commissioner rather than to the witness.

MR. LAMEK: Mr. Scott is entirely right and I apologize.

MR. ORTVED: I am going to deal with Mr. Lamek's question as a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman.



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THE COMMISSIONER: The post mortem did indicate that there was samples that were contaminated.

MR. ORTVED: That is right.

THE COMMISSIONER: I am not too sure

I know what contamination means. Contaminated obviously

means it is contaminated by other - I don't know how

this affects, and I am not at all sure that Dr. Rowe

knows how it affects the reading.

MR. ORTVED: No, and he may not, but I suppose we will find out shortly.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. What, we are lost now, what was the question?

MR. ORTVED: I will rephrase it.


THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

MR. ORTVED: Q. And I am content to deal with them individually. Dealing then firstly with the sample obtained from the pelvic cavity, the sample that in his evidence Dr. Taylor indicated was contaminated with edema and ascites fluid.

A. Yes.

Q. Dealing with that sample alone, what is your view, if you have one, as to whether or not that would contaminate the sample?

A. That would contain, that is really





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
the equivalent of having tissue in the sample and therefore could contain much higher levels of digoxin than in blood alone.

And dealing with the second sample which Dr. Taylor indicated he took, the sample milked from the leg vein, do you have a view as to whether or not that sample would be contaminated?

have a view at the time, but I now appreciate that if you were to do something like that you might massage material from outside the system into that system.

A.

Well, I didn't have, I didn't



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And just in the same way that cardiac massage we know can induce increased levels in cardiac samples we could expect the same in the peripheral blood.

Now I am not an expert in that area and I have said before that that is something that a pharmacologist is more able to answer than I am.

Q. Certainly.

A. But I would be pretty suspicious on the basis of present knowledge about those two samples.

Q. All right.

Now in his questions of you, and I refer specifically to page 2717 of Volume 16 of July 26 --

THE COMMISSIONER: The page again,

please?

MR. ORTVED: 2717, Mr. Commissioner.


Q. You were asked this question

by Mr. Lamek:

"Q. If you had seen the additional sample of greater than 4.7 taken from a separate vein source?"

Maybe I should go back and put it

in context. I suppose I should go back one question to 2716 to put it in context, Mr. Commissioner.



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At the bottom of 2716:

"Q. Now, Doctor, I can appreciate that seeing a level of 72 nanograms in the autopsy report in that way would indeed have stretched your credulity. I can understand that.

May I ask you this: if you were to see a level of 72 nanograms and in an accompanying sample, but separate sample, a level of greater than 4.7 higher than the last measured level in the child, and after four days of no administration of the drug, would that have lessened your incredulity?"

"A. If I had seen one in --"

"Q. If you had seen the additional sample of greater than 4.7 taken from a separate vein source?"

And your answer is:

"Well, it would depend upon the vein source. I think if there is any possibility that that was contaminated too, then that might make some difference.

But at any rate I think that

His confidence in his thetis grows from
monent to monent!

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would suggest - although we don't know what 4.7 is, I agree because it doesn't say."

"Q. We don't know how high --"

"A. -- how high it would go."

Now dealing firstly with Mr. Lamek's

question to you, "If you had seen the additional sample of greater than 4.7 taken from a separate vein source?", what is your view now having regard to what you heard read to you from Dr. Taylor's evidence at the preliminary inquiry as to whether or not this second sample can be called a truly venous sample of blood?

- A. I don't think it can be.
- Q. And having heard what Dr.

Taylor said at the preliminary inquiry, what is your view now as to your answer in terms of whether there is any possibility that that was contaminated?

- A. I think it probably was.
- Q. Having regard then to your

perception now based on what you know now - I appreciate it being more than what you knew when you first saw the report of Dr. Manser - but having regard to what you know now, had you known all of that back in March of 1981, what do you say, and I will use Mr. Scott's



it.

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question, what do you say as to whether that would have provided any evidence that you could have relied on in terms of digoxin being a cause of death?

A. You couldn't have relied on

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SHINEHOFT: Could the witness please repeat that answer.

THE WITNESS: You could not have relied upon it.


MR. SHINEHOFT: Thank you.

MR. ORTVED: Q. We know from your telling us that you didn't perceive this result until some time in March, the second week in March you say, and there has been some question raised as to the alacrity with which these reports reach referring physicians. But having regard to your reaction to that report when you did receive it, would it have made a difference if you had received it earlier?

A. No.

Q. If I could just move on to the question of Baby Pacsai.

Pacsai we know died March 12, 1981 and it has been amply demonstrated in the evidence that there was an ante mortem serum digoxin level for that child which eventually came to be 25; is that right?



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A. In that region. I can't remember exactly.

MR. SHINEHOFT: I may be able to help, Mr. Commissioner. It is my understanding it was greater than 10 and the post mortem sample was 25.

MR. ORTVED: Thank you, Mr. Shinehoft.

Q. In any event are you able to assist us as to when you came into possession of information that the levels in relation to Baby Pacsai were elevated, substantially elevated?

A. I learned that on the Wednesday following the death, which would be the 18th.

Q. 18th of March?

A. I think that is the date.

Q. And you have told us in your evidence-in-chief that you are able to fix that date by a reference to the memorandum of Dr. Carver; is that right?

THE COMMISSIONER: Is that date the

18th of March?

THE WITNESS: That is the 18th of

March.

MR. ORTVED: Q. Now can you just refresh my memory as to how you came to know and in



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of March.

what	context	you	came	to	know	of	that	elevated	level?
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Pediatrics, was informed of that level by Dr. Costigan, the Chief Resident, and he called Dr. Fowler and myself together and informed us of that result and asked that we undertake certain actions, the first of which was to call the Coroner again, who had been notified at the time of death, to let him know that result and ask him what further -- what his further wishes were, and Dr. Fowler was the person who performed that task.

Then we were requested to look into the aspects of how that level may have arisen, particularly with regard to the administration and the nature of the digoxin solution that were applicable on the ward, and those were the requests that were made of us on that day.

- Q. And this is what day?
- A. This is Wednesday, the 18th
- Q. What were the views of yourself, firstly, in relation to how that elevated level may have been obtained?
- A. Well, we felt at the time that must be a misadministration of the drug.
 - Q. Did you have any views as to



Rowe ex. (Ortved)

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	how	that	misadministration	had	come	about?
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A. We thought it could be accidental or it might even be intentional.

Q. In terms of your, if we can use the expression, index of suspicion at the time, did you favour one or the other of those possibilities?

A. Well, we first looked at the question of accidental. That was the first approach to those two possibilities.

Q. Because I don't know whether it has been asked, did you or Dr. Fowler, with whom I understand you discussed the case, make any connection between that level and the level you had seen in relation to Estrella?

A. No, we didn't.

Q. And in terms of communications with the Coroner did you have any --

A. No.

Q. -- at this time in relation to Baby Pacsai?

A. No, this was being handled by Dr. Fowler who originally reported the patient, the case, to the Coroner.

Q. All right. In terms of the views you had as to how this child had come by its

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you saying as to whether that was communicated to the Coroner?

A. I don't know what was

elevated level and the action being taken, what are

directly communicated to the Coroner except I believe Dr. Fowler said to me that the Coroner had suggested in response to a question we had about whether the family should be informed at that stage about this, I believe his response was that until the matter was clarified further there should be no comment.

Q. All right.

A. So I don't know what Dr.

Fowler specifically said about which he thought was the more likely possibility.

Q. All right.

And then I don't think it is any problem leading in respect of what was done by Dr. Fowler because we have a memorandum in that regard that has been filed as Exhibit 110, which details his investigations; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. That investigation was along the lines of what had been done, what had been prescribed for the child, whether there had been any error in the dose given, whether the concentrations of

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digoxin were as advertized; correct?

A. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: What do you

think?

MR. ORTVED: I'm almost finished.

There are some small matters of housekeeping that will take ten minutes which I may be able to finish off on Tuesday morning.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Fine.

MR. ORTVED: Let me ask three or

four more questions and I will leave it until Tuesday

morning, Mr. Commissioner.

Q. Then, when was Dr. Fowler's report or investigation and report back concluded?

A. That was concluded on

Friday, I believe.

Q. That would be the 20th?

A. Yes.

Q. And what is the next development in terms of the chronology of events so far as you were concerned, Dr. Rowe?

A. The next that I learned about that was on Saturday, the 21st, when I had come in to the Hospital to engage in a quiet morning's dictation and catching up.

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I was informed that there was a meeting called by the Coroner, by the Acting Chief Coroner, in his office in the Coroner's building, and that it concerned the matter of Pacsai and Estrella.

Q. All right.

Then up to this point in time had the connection between Pacsai and Estrella occurred to you?

A. There hadn't -- I hadn't thought of it in that way but when those two came together on that day, obviously I had to think again.

Q. And just if you could try
and recreate for us your index of suspicion or your
perception at the time as to accidental versus
intentional. Was that altered by the impressing
upon you of the connection or the possible connection
bewteen Estrella and Pacsai?

A. Yes.



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Q. And that was on Saturday the 21st?

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A. Yes.

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MR. ORTVED: Okay. Then, Mr.

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Commissioner, I have some housekeeping to take care of, but I'm perfectly content to do that on Tuesday morning. I won't be very long.

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THE COMMISSIONER: We will do that on

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Tuesday.

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MR. LAMEK: Mr. Commissioner, could we deal with perhaps one other thing and that is the

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following order of cross-examination for next week.

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I think Counsel might find that helpful.

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THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I don't

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know what you and Mr. Sopinka want to work out but I think you have now got priority if you want to keep it.

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MR. STRATHY: I'm quite happy this

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one time; at least I'm ready to do it.

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THE COMMISSIONER: And probably he will

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be next. Mr. Hunt, you or someone will be after that. This is always subject to some other arrangement people

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want to make. We will follow then I guess with Mr.

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Percival.

MR. OLAH: I think, Mr. Commissioner,

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I should point out something in Mr. Mannings absence,

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I think he was indicating he has to be in Quebec for the Bar Association meeting, so, he will probably want to seek some sort of assistance from you in that regard.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, he hasn't

I take it been able to arrange anything with anyone
else, is that the case?

MR. OLAH: I don't know, but I know that somewhere along the line he will want to --THE COMMISSIONER: When is the Bar Association anyway?

MR. LOAH: I'm not sure at what point he has to leave but I know he has to be in Quebec City, so, I thought I would just bring that to your attention.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, subject to what Mr. Manning has to say.

MR. SHINEHOFT: I understand, Mr.

Commissioner, that it is Counsel for the parents
who will be examining last, is that correct?

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, that is the

ordinary rule, yes.

MR. SHINEHOFT: Well, I was jammed in between before, but now that I have been moved back to my proper place I assume that I will be



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conducting my cross-examination at the same time as my friend.

THE COMMISSIONER: Not at the same time, one or the other!

MR. SHINEHOFT: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: But I will just take it whatever way you have seated yourselves as the order you want to proceed and if I see two of you sitting in the same chair then I know we will have a problem.

MR. SCOTT: Mr. Commissioner, those of us who have finished our cross-examination, Mr. Lamek and I, we are both concerned about the inordinate length of time that this exercise is taking.

MR. YOUNG: Mr. Commissioner, just so I am clear, I understand Mr. Strathy will be beginning? THE COMMISSIONER: I think he will be It looks as though Mr. Strathy and beginning. Mr. Sopinka and Mr. Hunt and then Mr. Percival.

MR. YOUNG: Thank you very much.

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't know how long they will be but I would be certainly very surprised if you come on on Tuesday.

MR. YOUNG: No, I would expect it would be late next week at the earliest.



THE COMMISSIONER: And then we will follow with, I guess in the ordinary way, and that is the nurses and the nurses assistants followed by the parents, unless you want to make some other arrangement.

Have I left somebody out?

No. I have left two out, I have left out the other two of the Trayner team. Well, they go first and then wherever I find you seated we will do that subject to what Mr. Manning says.

MR. STRATHY: Maybe after all of that is done Dr. Rowe can test us on our cardiac knowledge.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, I'm sure we might do fairly well.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned until Tuesday, August 23rd, 1983 at 10:00 am.



